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ABSTRACT
Emerging research suggests that property rights play a significant role in the economic
and social development of nations. To test this proposition, this study examines the case of
Jamaica and whether there is a relationship between property rights and development. In
order to carry out this investigation, this study gathers and analyzes existing research to:
1. define the extent that Jamaicans lack property rights and how this affects their
everyday quality of life and vulnerability to poverty;
2. examine the relationship between the absence of property rights and
underdevelopment; and
3. explore how the current international and local Jamaican policy environment is
positioned to address an absence of property rights.
This research confirms that there is a significant proportion of Jamaicans who do not
have access to property rights, that this is related to social and economic underdevelopment,
and that the international and local policy environment does not sufficiently address the
absence of property rights. As demonstrated by the case of Jamaica, development approaches
and Government of Jamaica policy may need to be adjusted to include property rights.
This research involves four stages. Chapter Two provides an overview of the literature
related to the study of property rights and development. Chapter Three estimates the extent of
the absence of property rights in Jamaica and elaborates how this affects everyday quality of
life regarding housing, work, security, and public infrastructure. Chapter Four explores the
connection between Jamaica’s lack of property rights and underdevelopment. Chapter Five
examines the international and local policy environment to better understand the official
response to the absence of property rights. Finally, the research concludes with policy
recommendations for the Government of Jamaica, to establish a task force charged with
property rights reform, to transform the political patronage system, and to creatively seek
resources, funding and partnerships from donor nations and organizations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Rationale and Research Question
Emerging research suggests that property rights play a significant role in the economic and
social development of nations. To test this proposition, this study examines the case of Jamaica and
whether there is a relationship between property rights and development. In order to carry out this
investigation, this study conducts research in three stages by:
1. defining the extent that Jamaicans lack property rights and how this affects their everyday
quality of life and vulnerability to poverty;
2. examining the relationship between the absence of property rights and underdevelopment;
and
3. exploring how the current international and local Jamaican policy environment is positioned
to address an absence of property rights.
Purpose of the Study
I was fortunate to reside in Jamaica recently for two years as a development worker, living
alongside the poorest of Jamaica’s population. What I found troubling was that most of the
Jamaicans I knew existed outside of the legal system. They did not have land titles or legal business
licensing. Most did not receive workplace benefits or labor protection. They were unable to access
capital or loans because they do not own legal, formal security to be used for collateral. The illegal
taxi cab drivers that my community relied on frequently bribed police officers in order to avoid jail
and confiscation of their vehicles. Untaxed and unregulated street vendors risked being fined and
their goods confiscated. Many Jamaicans whose homes were built in illegal squatter communities
lived under the daily possibility of eviction or bulldozing.
To become legal required more money and resources than they had. It appeared to me that
Jamaicans had no choice but to work, live and conduct their daily affairs in the black market
economy. I couldn’t understand why no apparent attention was being given to the issue by the
government or by development agencies. I found that a rich assortment of field work, surveys and
research have focused on individual issues typically assumed to be caused by poverty or culture. For
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example, there are excellent studies exist on the issue of Jamaica’s informal street vending, illegal
transportation, or squatters. Distinct from those studies, this research is the first to treat these issues
as pieces belonging to a larger puzzle, framing them under the overarching issue of property rights.
In the context of Jamaica, this research is the first in its field.
This research confirms that there is a significant proportion of Jamaicans who do not have
access to property rights, that this is related to social and economic underdevelopment, and that the
international and local policy environment does not sufficiently address the absence of property
rights. Based on this research it is reasonable to conclude that there exists a serious policy oversight
by international donors and the Government of Jamaica. For decades, Western international
governance bodies such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO have steered developing nations like
Jamaica to implement market liberalization and democratization; however without the underlying
foundation of property rights these reforms may result in damaging unintended consequences rather
than hoped-for development. As Thomas Friedman argues in his recent bestselling books on
globalization, implementing free market capitalism without strong institutions is the equivalent of
purchasing new computer hardware without software.1 As demonstrated by the case of Jamaica,
development approaches and western advice may need to be adjusted to include property rights.

Methodology
The research design is constructed as a focused case study. Case studies are the preferred
method when how and why questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. 2 This
study explores the sequence and structure of events and the testimony of actors to explain the

1

Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 1999),151; Ibid, The World is Flat
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 309-336.
2
Robert Yin, Applications of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003).
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relationship between property rights and underdevelopment. Jamaica’s historical record will serve as
the data. The research incorporates secondary data such as interviews and surveys collected by field
research professionals. The research also relies on existing sociological, anthropological, and
economic analyses in academic journals, books, and occasional papers, and committee reports. Many
of the sources are from the Government of Jamaica and multilateral development institutions. The
research incorporates accounts from daily newspapers such as the Jamaica Gleaner, as well as the
speech and writings of policy actors and everyday Jamaicans. In addition, my familiarity with
Jamaican culture and the daily reality of hardships faced by Jamaicans helped in understanding the
significance and context of the findings.
Because the study of property rights as an institutional problem is a relatively new field,
development scholars have emphasized the need for country-specific case studies. “Country case
studies show important links between good governance institutions and economic success, but they
also highlight special features of each countries. The work of distilling general insights that are likely
to remain valid for other countries is only just beginning.”3
This research involves four stages. Chapter Two provides an overview of the literature
related to the study of property rights and development. Chapter Three estimates the extent of the
absence of property rights in Jamaica and elaborates how this affects everyday quality of life
regarding housing, work, security, and public infrastructure. Chapter Four explores the connection
between Jamaica’s lack of property rights and underdevelopment. Chapter Five examines the
international and local policy environment to better understand the official response to the absence
of property rights. Finally, the research concludes with recommendations for Government of
Jamaica policy makers.

3

Avinash Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 150.
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Case Selection and Significance of the Research
Typical of Anglophone Caribbean nations, Jamaica’s transition from a British colonial slaveholding nation to a modern, democratic capitalist economy has not been easy. Although an
independent nation for 40 years, having been labeled a showcase World Bank and IMF client, and
despite implementation of market liberalization and democratic reforms, Jamaica continues to
struggle to overcome an inherited legacy of underdevelopment.
Jamaica is typical of Caribbean island economies that struggle as small closed markets with
historical low growth rates and endemic unemployment. Jamaica’s current unemployment rate is 15
percent, and 25 percent of Jamaicans live below the poverty line.4 In certain urban areas, the
unemployment rate can be as high as 80 percent.5 Jamaican regulators have been skeptical of
technology and innovation due to its adverse impact on jobs, resulting in Jamaica’s industries
becoming less competitive, and falling further behind in industrializing. And as for solutions, there is
not yet a consensus on models for Caribbean development.6 The 2004 CIA World Factbook
summarizes Jamaica’s economic outlook as bleak:
Jamaica’s economy faces serious long-term problems: high interest rates; increased
foreign competition; a pressured, sometimes sliding, exchange rate; a sizable
merchandise trade deficit; large-scale unemployment; and a growing internal debt, the
result of government bailouts to ailing sectors of the economy. The ratio of debt to
GDP is close to 150%. Inflation, previously a bright spot, is expected to remain in the
double digits. Uncertain economic conditions have led to increased civil unrest,
including gang violence fueled by the drug trade. In 2004, the government faced the
difficult prospect of having to achieve fiscal discipline in order to maintain debt
payments while simultaneously attacking a serious and growing crime problem which is
hampering economic growth.7

Despite these disadvantages, it seems possible for Jamaica to become strategically positioned
for economic development and global competition. The 2005 UNDP Human Development Report
4

Mark Wenner, Microenterprise Development in Jamaica: Preliminary Assessment (Washington DC: IADB, 1996).
United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for the United States –
Jamaica, West Indies (Washington, DC: International Trade Administration, 1986).
6
Anthony Payne, Charting Caribbean Development (The University Press of Florida: Gainesville, FL, 2001).
7
CIA World Factbook, (Washington DC, 2004).
5
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ranks Jamaica as an MDC, or Middle Developing Country, as opposed to a Lower Developing
Country. Jamaica possesses natural resources such as one of the world’s largest natural harbors, the
largest English-speaking population south of Miami, year-round tourism, bauxite, the key mineral to
manufacture aluminum, and close proximity to the American and Canadian consumer markets.
Additionally, Jamaica’s banking sector is relatively well developed.8
And yet is Jamaica luring foreign direct investment? According to the United Nations 2002
World Investment Report, out of 140 countries, Jamaica is ranked 79th on the FDI (foreign direct
investment) potential index, far behind Singapore and Taiwan.9 India is establishing Englishlanguage call centers and medical transcription services while Jamaica, a naturally English-speaking
country, lags behind. Although Jamaica had a higher per capita GDP in the 1960s than did
Singapore and South Korea, that is far from the reality today.10
This research examines whether the absence of property rights in Jamaica contributes to our
understanding of such underdevelopment. The results have implications for Government of Jamaica
policy, as well as multilateral and bilateral development policy, distribution of assistance and
interventions. The Washington consensus ideology that dominates development policy may need to
include necessary pre-conditions, such as property rights. Property rights have also become of
interest to policy makers and researchers in security studies. Military strategists are recognizing that
black markets provide the support and infrastructure for criminal and terrorist activities.11 Theories
and models that can shape policy to combat informal economies will be received with interest.

8

Mitchell, Harold, Politics and Economics in the Caribbean (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1968), 326.
United Nations, World Investment Report (Washington, D.C.: 2002), 25.
10
Donald Allen and Michelle Gyles, “Trade, Growth and Capital: A Case Study of Jamaica,” (St. Louis: working
paper for the St. Louis Federal Reserve, 1995).
11
Geoffrey Demarest, Mapping Colombia: The Correlation between Land Data and Strategy (Washington, DC:
military strategy paper for the Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003).
9
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review is not intended to be an exhaustive review of existing research on property
rights. Rather, it provides an overview of emerging knowledge regarding three key issues:
I. Definition of property rights and the informal economy
II. The difficulty of measuring property rights
III. The relationship between property rights and economic development
I. Property Rights: Definition and Key Concepts
Property refers to the ownership of an asset or possession. There are different types of
property. Real property is immovable and typically of high value, such as one’s home, land, or
commercial real estate. Commercial property might include inventory or business equipment such
as machinery. Moveable personal property may include furniture. An example of intangible
property would be the value of one’s own labor and capacity to work. Intellectual property is a
creation of the intellect that has value, for example artistic creations or business methods.
Property rights are referred to as a bundle of legal rights because there are multiple rights to
one’s assets.12 These rights includes the right to use the property as one sees fit (subject to certain
restrictions, such as zoning), the right to exclude others from using it, and the right to rent, transfer
or sell it.
Property rights are different from mere possession in that a claim “will be enforced by
society or the state, by customs or convention or law.”13 Government institutions are integral to the
definition and enforcement of property rights through the court system and police enforcement. As
individuals compete for resources, an enforced property rights system provides externally imposed
rules, laws or ordinances that minimize conflict over resources. This is not so for developing nations
with weak institutions and limited resources. “If property rights are not well defined and enforced,
12

Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Random House, 1999); Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney,
Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
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the incentive to take by threat or violence increases, with the predictable results that resource owners
will invest less in developing their property or even keeping it up.”14
Property rights may exist in theory or may be written in constitutions, but may not be
enforced, clearly defined, or accessible to the majority of the population. The driving focus behind
this research is to gain an understanding of the widespread absence of property rights common in
developing nations, how it affects people, and what governments can do about it.

II. The Difficulty of Measuring Property Rights
Where property rights are absent, the very nature of an illegal, unrecorded shadow economy
makes it difficult to quantify and measure. Some compare it to speculating about the dark side of the
moon. Institutions such as the Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector Research Center and
United Nations Development Programme are currently in the process of developing metrics and
indicators for property rights; however they are not yet available.
There are many obstacles to measuring the informal economy. There is overlap and crossover between formal and informal sectors, such as when formal businesses engage in informal
activities like paying employees under the table.
Data collection techniques such as surveys or direct interviews are problematic. Subjects are
reluctant to voluntarily discuss their illegal activities such as living on captured land or running an
unregistered business. People are not likely to candidly report untaxed personal income. Tax
auditing methods used to measure the discrepancy between declared taxable income and actual

13

Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Random House, 1999), xv.
Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney, Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2002), 6.

14
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income also have inherent weaknesses. Tax auditing methods are likely to be biased because audits
are typically selected upon suspicion of fraud.15
Given such empirical murkiness, researchers have designed creative techniques to measure
property rights. Economist Hernando de Soto’s research team investigated regulations and measured
the costs and barriers for the everyday person in Peru to access property rights. They set up a
fictitious clothing factory in Peru and went through the procedure of establishing it legally. The
findings were published in The Other Path, which is recognized as the classic study of property rights.
The research team found that it took 289 days to register the factory and took the full-time labor of
the group assigned to the task, as well as $1,231 (including expenses and lost wages), the equivalent
of 32 minimum monthly wages. They researched legal housing and found that it would take six years
and eleven months to navigate various ministries and municipal offices and cost approximately 56
times the minimum monthly wage. To get a license to sell goods from a pushcart required 43 days of
commuting and a cost of 15 times the minimum monthly wage.16 The significance of de Soto’s
findings is that heavy regulatory burdens on legal business and home ownership make it practically
impossible for the majority of people in developing nations to access legal property rights.
Also using creative research methods, researcher James Smith recognized that those
operating illegally would be reluctant to be interviewed. Smith therefore estimated the size of the
informal economy in the U.S. by interviewing families about the value and type of purchases they
made from vendors selling goods and services.17 He was able to estimate that $42 billion in informal
economic activity took place in 1981 in the U.S., the majority of which were home repairs, food
sales, childcare and domestic services.
15

Kevin McCrohan, James Smith and T. Adams, “Consumer Purchases in Informal Markets: Estimates for the
1980s, Prospects for the 1990s,” Journal of Retailing 67 (1991): 22-50; and for a detailed review of measurement
techniques for informal economies, see Friedrich Schneider,“Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in
110 Countries Around the World” (Washington, D.C.: working paper for the World Bank, 2002).
16
Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (New York: Harper and Row,
1989), xii.
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Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer18 developed a property rights index using institutional
indicators obtained from two private international investment risk services. They utilized the
variables “expropriation risk” and “rule of law” as proxies for the security of property, “repudiation
of contracts by government” as an indicator of contract enforcement, “corruption in government”
and “quality of the bureaucracy” to represent the extend and damage of rent-seeking behavior, as
well as “contract enforceability” “infrastructure quality” “nationalization potential” and
“bureaucratic delays.”
Finally, a commonly used approach used by economists is the currency ratio model.19 This
model relies upon the likelihood that those who conduct their affairs in the informal sector use
under the table cash currency either to avoid detection, or because they lack access to checking
accounts or credit cards. The currency ratio model studies the changes in currency holdings, or the
ratio of noncurrency money to the total money supply. Using this method, economists conclude that
an increase in the currency ratio indicates that more business is being transacted outside the
regulatory framework.

III. The Relationship Between Property Rights and Economic Development
When using the term development, this research is referring to both economic and social
development, typically measured in terms of jobs and income, but it also includes improvements in
quality of life such as human development, social infrastructure, education, health, choice, and
environmental sustainability.
17

James Smith, “Measuring the Informal Economy,” The Annals of the American Academy (1987): 84-99.
Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alterative
Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics 7 (1995): 207-227.
19
Karl Bennett, “Economic Decline and the Growth of the Informal Sector: The Guyana and Jamaican Experience,”
Journal of International Development 7 (1995): 229-242; P.M. Guttman, “The Subterranean Economy,” Financial
Analysis Journal 33 (1977): 24-27; Eric Feige, “Momentary Methods of Estimating Informal Activities in
Developing Countries” in Demographic Change and Economic Development, Alois Wenig and Klaus Zimmermann,
eds., (London: Springer, 1989).
18
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Development experts and scholars have only recently recognized the relationship between
property rights and development. Economist Douglas North pioneered the field of New
Institutional Economics and linked country characteristics such as the security of property rights
directly to the prosperity of nations. 20 Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto’s research and policy
recommendations on property rights have been implemented in his native Peru and other
developing nations. 21
Influenced by North, economist Avanash Dixit studied the problem of property rights and
development in depth, and concluded: “anticipation of opportunism, theft, or extortion constitutes a
strong disincentive to make potentially valuable investments or entering into mutually beneficial
contracts in the first place. Therefore if market economies are to succeed, they need a foundation of
mechanisms…to sustain adequate incentives to invest, produce and exchange. In other words,
markets need the underpinning of institutions of economic governance.”22 Economist Norman
Loayza developed economic growth model formulas to study the effect of the informal economy
and concluded, “...the relative size of the informal sector is negatively correlated with the rate of
economic growth.”23
The 2002 Economic Freedom of the World Index24 reports that between 1990 and 2000,
nations that scored in the top fifth of the economic freedom rankings had secure property rights.
Nations that had secure property rights had an average per capita income of US $23,450, with an
average economic growth rate of 2.6 a year. Nations that scored low on secure property rights had
20

Douglass North, Economics of Public Issues (New York: Harper and Row, 1980); ibid, Understanding the
Process of Economic Change (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005).
21
De Soto, Hernando. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Succeeds in the West and Fails Everywhere Else
(New York: Basic Books, 2000), 6; Ibid, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (New York:
Harper and Row, 1989).
21
Ibid, xii.
22
Avinash Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2.
23
Norman Loayza,“The Economics of the Informal Sector: a Simple Model and Some Empirical Evidence from
Latin America,” Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 45 (1996), 142.
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an average per capita income of US $2,560, with an average negative growth rate of 0.9 percent.
Similarly, the Knack and Keefer property rights index described above revealed a correlation
between under performing economies and low scores on property rights.25
Seth Norton found that secure property rights have a positive relationship to environmental
quality and human well being, including such factors as safe drinking water, sewage treatment access,
and life expectancy. He summarized that “…property rights and its related construct, the rule of law,
and…freedom from property rights attenuation, are all positively related to economic growth. Their
absence leads to economic stagnation and decline.”26
Lack of secure property rights and large informal economies reduce government ability to
collect taxes to provide public goods, services and infrastructure. Johnson, Kaufmann, and ZoidoLobaton27 found that countries with higher tax revenues have smaller informal economies.
Nations with large informal economies may be trapped in a dangerous underdevelopment
cycle. Ybarra conducted a case study of informal businesses in Valencia Spain and found that the
nature of informalization is self-reinforcing by strengthening “…its own rules: labor conditions
erode and wages shrink; entrepreneurial efforts center on strategies to conceal clandestine activities
more and better. This reduces or eliminates incentives for technological progress, innovation, and
investment.”28 A study of informal economies in 25 countries found quantitative evidence that
“...once established, the shadow economy is hard to remove.”29 In 2001, seventeen developing
24

James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, The Economic Freedom of the World: 2002 Annual Report (Vancouver:
Fraser Institute, 2002).
25
Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alterative
Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics 7 (1995): 207-227.
26
Seth Norton, “Property rights, the environment, and economic well-being” in Who Owns the Environment? Peter
J. Hill and Roger E. Meiners, eds., (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 44.
27
Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, “Corruption, Public Finances and the Unofficial
Economy” (Washington, D.C.: working paper for The World Bank, 1998).
28
Josep-Antoni Ybarra, “Informationalization in the Valencian economy: A Model for Underdevelopment” in The
Informal Economy, Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells and Lauren Benton, eds., (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1989), 224.
29
Clifford Zinnes and Yair Eliat, “The Shadow Economy in Transition Counties: Friend or Foe? A Policy
Perspective,” World Development 30 (2002): 1233.
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countries had seen an actual decline in the security of property rights.30 If an absence of property
rights exists in a self-perpetuating cycle, then it is of the utmost importance that governments
recognize the problem. Property rights will not become accessible to the majority of a nation's
citizens without intervention.
To conclude, the current literature presented here provides an overview of existing
scholarship regarding the definition of property rights, strengths and weaknesses of various research
methods for the measurement of property rights, and evidence of a connection between property
rights and development. It is upon this foundation of knowledge that we launch our exploration of
property rights in Jamaica.

30

Gerald O’Driscoll, Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick, Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.:
Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, 2001).
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CHAPTER 3: THE ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN JAMAICA: A PORTRAIT

I. Absence of Property Rights for Housing and Land
A functioning property rights system for housing and land is often taken for granted in the
developed West. It provides a legal
foundation that enables
unambiguous and secure ownership
of property, the ability to build equity
and establish collateral for credit,
increased likelihood of investment in
repairs and upgrades, increased
likelihood to be compliant with
zoning and environmental

Figure 2. Informal housing in Old Harbour, Jamaica.
Photograph by Joe Nagle, 2003.

regulations, more years of education for children, and lower birth rates. 31 The United Nations
Economic and Social Council strongly affirmed the importance of property rights to enhance
development:
No country can sustain stability within its boundaries, or economic development
within the wider world, unless it has a land rights policy that promotes internal
confidence among its people, its commercial enterprises, and its government.
Recognizing that land is a source of wealth lies at the heart of good government and
effective public administration. States that prosper promote widespread and secured
private ownership of land as a foundation of social and economic policy.32

31

United Nations Economic Commission, “Social and Economic Benefits of Good Land Administration” (working
paper, 1998); Economic Report of the President, “The Benefits of Land Titles,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing
Office, 2005); Gershon Feder and Akihiko Nishio, “The Benefits of Land Registration and Titling: Economic and
Social Perspectives,” Land Use Policy 15 (1999): 25-43; Louis DeAlessi,“Gains from Private Property: The
Empirical Evidence” in Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law, Terry L. Anderson and Fred S.
McChesney, eds., (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); Sebastian Galiani and Ernesto Schargrodsky,
“Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling” (working paper, August 9, 2005).
32
United Nations Economic Commission, “Social and Economic Benefits of Good Land Administration” (working
paper, 1998).
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In marked contrast, in a nation like Jamaica where property rights for housing and land is
inaccessible to the majority of its population, the government is overwhelmed by problems created
by widespread informal housing development. These problems include illegal building,
environmental degradation, unplanned urban and rural development, squatting, occupation of flood
prone areas, or inadequate infrastructure such as roads, sewage or utilities.
As recently as 2002, the Jamaican Ministry of Land and Environment estimated that 50-70
percent of housing development takes place outside the formal legal system.33 Rapid urbanization
has particularly amplified mass informal building in Jamaica’s major cities of Kingston and Montego
Bay. The population of the Kingston metropolitan area increased from 379,980 in 1960 to 868,653
in 2001, much of which resulted in rapid informal housing development.34 A geographer’s case study
of the rapid urbanization of Montego Bay concluded that the total population living in newly
constructed informal shantytowns was 20,100, or 40 percent of the city. The same author’s study of
Spanish Town found that 36 percent of homes were built informally on captured or rent land.35
Of Jamaica’s estimated one million parcels of land, 450,000 have been formally registered at
some point in time; however many of those registered titles are likely to be outdated after sale or
subdivision. The Jamaican government acknowledges that poor institutional infrastructure is a
significant cause of the inaccessibility and unaffordablity of land to a large portion of the population,
particularly low-income households. According to the Ministry of Land and Environment, “…the
unavailability of legally accessible and affordable land has contributed to the chronic problems of
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Jacqueline DaCosta, “Integrating Land Issues into the Broader Development Agenda: Case Study Jamaica” (paper
presented by Ministry of Land and Environment, Jamaica for Regional Workshop on Land Issues in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Pachuca, Mexico, May 19-22, 2002), 6.
34
Colin Clark and David Howard, “Class, Unemployment and Housing Problems in Kingston, Jamaica since
Independence,” (working paper, Nd).
35
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squatting and other illegal development on both government and private lands, sometimes under
severely precarious and environmentally unfriendly conditions.”36
The Jamaica Gleaner interviewed Glendon Newsome, senior lecturer in the Department of
Building and Land Management at the University of Technology and vice-president of the Land
Surveyors Association of Jamaica. Newsome stated that the absence of ownership titles has created
uncertainty for thousands of Jamaicans. He elaborated: “For a small farmer, registration of a square
of land - about say one tenth of an acre, can cost as much as the value of land…Fees charged by the
attorney, land surveyor and titles office vary according to the value of the land. But legal experts
explained that the cost of acquiring titles has been known to run anywhere from $30,000 to more
than $100,000 - sometimes costing as much as the value of the land.”37
High cost therefore is likely to be the reason why so many Jamaicans do not have formal
property rights to their homes and land. The minimum total cost associated with bringing the
smallest parcel of land under The Registration of Titles Act (where there is no complexity) is
approximately US $900 or J$45,000.38 Considering that Jamaica’s GDP per capita is $3,005,39 $900 is
an impossible figure for the majority of Jamaicans to afford. Few Jamaicans have access to credit or
mortgages, therefore land registration expenses must be paid up front and out of pocket. Typical
expenses include the cost to survey the land at a minimum of US $300, transfer taxes, stamp duties
for property registration regularization, sub-division approval fees, and Natural Resource and
Conservation Authority permit fees, not to mention additional legal service costs.
A recent letter to the editor in The Jamaica Gleaner illustrates a citizen’s frustration at delays
and his distrust of the bureaucracy:
36
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THE EDITOR, Sir:
IT WOULD appear that many attorneys-at-law have a vested interest in an inefficient
legal system and should the system become reasonably efficient, then many of them
would be without a job. Attorneys-at-law comprise 20 per cent of the representatives
in Parliament and if they were really interested in improving the system, they could
easily do so. Maybe they can earn more money in an inefficient legal system…in the
area of conveyanc-ing/real estate, a straightforward transfer of land involving a free
title and a cash purchaser is taking 60 to 90 days to be completed. If the transfer
entails the purchaser securing a mortgage then we are looking at an average period of
five months for completion, if you are lucky…The attorneys seem happy and relaxed
with the situation as it is and conveniently blame the Stamp Commissioner's Office
and the Titles Office for the lengthy delays…I do not get the impression that the Bar
Association, attorneys-at-law and financial institutions are even agitating for
improvements. Is it that they benefit financially from the inefficiencies of these
organisations? If not, I urge them to petition the relevant authorities for
improvement in these departments.
I am, etc.,
CONCERNED CITIZEN40

Zoning and building codes are too cumbersome and costly to be reasonably observed.
According to one researcher, a modest house that met the standards of the Kingston Development
Order would only be affordable to the earners in the top 15 percent bracket. Additionally, the
process to apply for subdivision required redundant referrals to multiple outside agencies.41 The lack
of an automated cadastral system and numerous of legal and administrative complexities imply that
it can take two to three years for a business or household to acquire clear title to a parcel of land it
wants to develop.42
Jamaica’s primary system for distributing housing and mortgages is through publicly
managed government housing schemes. Remarkably, even those who live in government housing
schemes often lack legal property rights. The Ministry of Land and Environment estimates that as
many as 50,000 parcels of land in government housing schemes and land settlements do not have

40

“Inefficient legal system,” Jamaica Gleaner, January 23, 2004.
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formally issued land titles. If even the government itself is unable to provide land titles for its own
properties, one can imagine the likelihood of the average Jamaican acquiring a land title.
It is not surprising that citizens find creative ways around the system. Economists predict
that high opportunity costs result in a search for alternative ways to achieve the task at hand. The
following Jamaica Gleaner article illustrates how most people grease the wheels of the bureaucracy to
obtain land titles:
Titles fraud 'could run into billions'
MASSIVE fraud at the Land Titles Division of the National Land Agency (NLA)
which may have cost billions of dollars in lost tax revenues is outlined in a report
now before the Cabinet… “The losses could run into billions," one informed
Government source told The Sunday Gleaner on condition of anonymity … "The
slowness and inefficiencies of the system lends itself to corruption because people cut
corners to get their things done and one thing leads to another."43

In a study of the relationship between class, unemployment, housing and services, the
researcher searched for correlations between 100 different variables in Jamaica, and concluded that
“…it seems safe to conclude that poor quality housing in Kingston, involving rental and squatting, is
rooted in low occupational status (mostly in the informal sector)…”44 This indicates that the same
people who are living in extra-legal housing are also working in extra-legal employment, discussed in
the next section.
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II. Absence of Property Rights Related to Labor and Self-Employment
In economies where property rights are firmly established, legal rules guide contracts between
buyers and sellers regarding the purchase, use or
sale of goods or assets. There are enforceable
contracts between employers and employees over
labor laws, wages, health insurance, pensions, and
safety. There are agreements regarding the
extension of credit to customers or suppliers and
legal penalties for failure to pay. Compliance with
regulations and taxes, and security and protection
from theft is assumed by most of the population.
In markets operating under property rights
systems, if expectations for product quality are not
met, consumers have confidence that the faulty
Figure 3. Jamaican Street Vendor.
Photograph by Joe Nagle, 2003.

product can be returned for replacement or refund.
None of the above described rules for

exchange can be counted on in economies where property rights are lacking, undefined, or not
enforced. Without property rights, developing nations inevitably contain a small legal formal
economy counterbalanced by a massive informal economy.
The informal economy can be used interchangeably with other terms such as invisible, black
market, parallel, hidden, submerged, shadow, irregular, non-official, unrecorded, or clandestine.45
Informal economies typically include masses of people employed in low wage and unlicensed work,
and where a large proportion of unregulated businesses operate with cash transactions under the
45
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level of taxing and regulatory monitoring and with undefined liability. Where “…rights to these
possessions are not adequately documented, these assets cannot readily be turned into capital,
cannot be traded outside of narrow local circles where people know and trust each other, cannot be
used as collateral for a loan, and cannot be used as a share against an investment.”46
When individuals operate outside the legal, formal economy, they typically do not have access to
the protection of their property, which in this case is their labor. They lack social protections such as
benefits, overtime pay, health insurance, social security, vacation time or protection from long work
hours. They can be arbitrarily fired, mistreated, or discriminated against; they can be shortchanged
on promised compensation.
Patricia Anderson’s study of Jamaica’s transportation system included interviews of 293 informal
drivers and workers. She found that 97.9 percent were paid in cash as a “deliberate attempt by the
employers to avoid any form of record-keeping or proper accounting system, in order to evade the
payment of income taxes.” Informal workers are therefore vulnerable to discrepancies. Her study
included an interview with an informal minibus worker who described how he had no recourse
when he was underpaid by his employer: “…him just fling it in mi hand and sey ‘gwan.’”47

46

Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Succeeds in the West and Fails Everywhere Else
(New York: Basic Books, 2000), 6.
47
Patricia Anderson and Hilary Bailey. Mini bus ride: a journey through the informal sector of Kingston’s mass
transportation system (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies,
1987), 87-88.
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World Bank Economist Friedrich Schneider conducted an analysis to measure the size of the
informal economies of 110 countries. He combined the currency ratio method (growth of large bills
used in economy) with a physical input
method to find the difference between the

Table 1. Shadow Economies in Percent of GNP 1999/2000
Country
Shadow Economy
Georgia

67.3% (highest)

Azerbaijan

60.6%

Bolivia

67.1%

Jamaica

36.4%

method, Schneider concludes that Jamaica’s

Mexico

30.1%

informal economy was 36.4 percent of GNP in

Chile

19.8%

2000. All countries have informal economies

France

15.3%

Switzerland and United States

8.8% (lowest)

officially registered GDP and the cross-rate of
total electricity consumption to detect the
growth of the informal economy. Using this

of various sizes, and Jamaica falls in the mid-

Source: Schneider (2002: 6-19, Tables 3,5,7 and 9)

range (see Table 1).

48

Various researchers utilizing different methods place the size of Jamaica’s informal economy
between 30 to 50 percent of the labor force. As an example, the Microenterprise Unit of the InterAmerican Development Bank estimates that between 16 and 38 percent of the total active labor
force is employed in microenterprises, the vast majority of which are unregistered and informal (95
percent).49 Table 2 provides a summary of eight different approaches that estimate the size of the
informal economy in Jamaica. Despite large variances in the estimates of each approach, all methods
reveal a significant growth in the informal economy over the last several decades.

48

Friedrich Schneider, “Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 110 Countries Around the World”
(working paper for the World Bank, 2002).
49
Mark Wenner, “Microenterprise Development in Jamaica: Preliminary Assessment” (Washington, D.C.: working
paper for IADB, 1996).
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Table 2. Various Estimates of the Size of Jamaica’s Informal Economy – all demonstrating growth over
time.
Statin;
SelfEmployed

Anderson
Witter

Bennett
(Feige)

Witter/
Kirton
(Gutman)
8.0
9.0
11.0
13.0
10.0
12.0
6.0
6.0
12.0
11.0
21.0
17.0
17.0
17.0
18.0
10.0
3.0
9.0
18.0
20.0
24.0
23.0
24.0

Witter/
Kirton
(Feige)
18.0
21.0
25.0
31.0
23.0
28.0
14.0
13.0
28.0
27.0
53.0
41.0
43.0
43.0
46.0
23.0
7.0
21.0
44.0
50.0
64.0
59.0
63.0

Kirton
Year
Spath
(Gutmann)
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
27.8
1973
1974
28.9
1975
29.7
15.3
1976
1977
30.3
18.5
50.5
1978
38.5
26.1
1979
39.3
41.6
1980
31.7
39.6
41.6
15.7
1981
42.8
1982
32.4
50.0
1983
20.7
47.1
1984
49.3
1985
33.5
22.5
53.1
23.0
1986
51.7
23.5
1987
56.1
26.0
1988
33.3
53.6
24.5
1989
31.4
23.4
78.1
39.4
1990
32.1
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Sources: Bennett (1991:14, Table 5), Kirton (1991:71, Table 3), Witter and Kirton (1990:7, Table 2.1), Statistical
Institute of Jamaica (1973: 31 Table 12), Anderson and Witter (1991:83, Table IV; 64, Table 4.6), Spath (1984:75
Table 2), Sander (1992: 111a, Table V.4).
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Patricia Anderson adapted labor market survey data into an index that includes
characteristics of Jamaica’s informal labor market. Anderson combined data from The National
Mobility Survey and a Manpower Utilization and Training Needs Survey. The combined index
allowed Anderson to estimate that 48 percent of the labor force operated within the informal
economy in 1984.50 Table 3 summarizes Anderson’s findings on Jamaica’s labor market. The
illustration is helpful because the small size of the formal economy becomes quickly visible
compared to the large size of the informal sector demonstrated by the first two columns on the left
(Informal and Secondary Formal). Anderson’s category of the secondary formal sector is semiinformal, composed of domestic workers with limited worker benefits and protections.
Jamaican Labor Market Segmentation

60.00%

50.00%

40.00%

30.00%

20.00%

10.00%

0.00%

Informal

Secondary Formal

Central Government

% Male

45.30%

39.90%

9.80%

Primary Formal
5.30%

% Female

53.00%

28.70%

15.30%

4.00%

Table 3. Distribution of Workers by Labor Market Sector
Source: Anderson (1987:161)
50

Patricia Anderson,“Informal Sector or Modern Labour Market? Towards a Synthesis,” Social and Economic
Studies 36 (1987): 149-176.
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Considerable field research has been conducted to understand Jamaica’s informal economy.51
To summarize the findings, a large portion of the informal sector includes those who are selfemployed in petty trade such as sidewalk vendors and higglers (individuals specializing in a
particular type of trading, often importing and selling foreign commercial goods). The informal
sector operates along a continuum of illegality, for example a portion of the informal economy
includes transactions in illegal substances such as ganja, cocaine or crack, pirated CDs, or illegal
services such as prostitution.
On the opposite end of the continuum are those who make transactions with non-criminal
goods but are unregistered or unregulated, such as the selling of brooms, arts and crafts, peanuts,
roasted fish, jerk chicken and pork, domestic produce such as fresh fruit and vegetables, clothing,
coal, empty bottles or newspapers. A large portion of the informal economy are those employed in
domestic services such as gardening, hand-laundering clothes, cooking and cleaning of homes, care
of children and other dependent persons. Other examples of informal service employment may
involve unregistered taxi and minibus drivers, vehicle windshield washing at traffic lights,
“watching” parked vehicles, vehicle repair, construction and appliance repair.

51

Patricia Anderson,“Informal Sector or Modern Labour Market? Towards a Synthesis,” Social and Economic
Studies 36 (1987): 149-176; Patricia Anderson and Hilary Bailey, Mini Bus Ride: a Journey through the Informal
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(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994); Ruth McLeod, “Low Income Shelter Strategies in Kingston,
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School of Social Sciences, The University of the West Indies, 1989); Faye Harrison, “Women in Jamaica’s Urban
Informal Economy: Insights from a Kingston Slum” in Blackness in Latin America and the Caribbean, Arlene
Torres and Norman Whitten, eds., (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988): 414-435; Melvin Edwards,
Jamaican Higglers: Their Significance and Potential (Norwich, England: Centre for Development Studies, 1979);
Alan Eyre, “The Shantytowns of Montego Bay, Jamaica,” Geographical Review 62 (1972): 394-413.
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Anderson’s findings that there are more women in the informal economy than men are
compatible with Jamaican Department of Statistics data stating that the rate of formal
unemployment for Jamaican women (39 percent) is more than twice as high as that for men (16
percent).52 Another Jamaica-based survey found that 80 percent of higglers and 52 percent of
sidewalk vendors are women. For all categories of higglers the majority of the women were the sole
support for their children, on average, 4.5 children per higgler.53
Based on interviews, one researcher found that 70 percent of higglers were formerly
unemployed and felt they had no alternative, and that those who went into higglering did so because
of “unemployment, business failure, illness of a partner, too old, or not qualified to do anything else,
or dislike for domestic work.”54 Start-up
capital typically comes from personal savings,

Table 4. Average Monthly Income by Labor Market
Sector, reported in Jamaican dollars.

Labor Market Sector

Average Monthly Income

Primary Formal

$1051.66

Central Government

$645.12

Secondary Formal

$447.21

minimum wage, although this data should be

Large Agriculture

$325.90

cautioned by noting that reported income was

Informal

$248.93

self-disclosed and may tend to be

Source: Anderson ( 1987: 167)

or credit from family and friends. Petty
traders and higglers have low-income
occupations, earning less or near to the

underreported. Those employed in the informal economy typically are low-income, living near or
below the poverty line. Jobs in the informal sector may pay 60 percent less on average than those in
the formal sector.55 Table 4 displays the differences in income compared across sectors.

52
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Victoria Durant-Gonzalez, “Higglering: the Rural Women and the Internal Market System in Jamaica” in Rural
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54
Michael Witter and C. Kirton, “The Informal Economy in Jamaica, Some Empirical Exercises” (Kingston,
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According to a report by an officer of the United Vendors’ Association, there are 15,000
higglers selling in Parade (a busy market area in downtown Kingston) and adjoining areas. Based on
reported data that each higgler supports 4.5 children on average, Witter approximates that Kingston
higglering alone supports 67,000 people or about three percent of the population. 56
Although most Jamaicans support informal vendors by buying from them, most public
statements and news stories portray them negatively. “Higglers have been repeatedly accused by the
spokesmen of the manufacturers of undercutting the local market with cheap imports…there are
frequent reports in the media of ‘aggressive’ behaviour by higglers at both Jamaican and foreign
airports…According to a Stone Poll, 70% of the public supported the government’s attempts…to
remove the higglers from the streets.”57
What may seem insensitive, intolerant and contradictory can be explained by problems
created by informal businesses. In the absence of regulation for businesses, streets can become
chaotic and unsafe, leading to dangerous traffic congestions, or environmental hazards. A Jamaica
Gleaner news story provides an example:
Brown's Town bus park losing thousands of dollars
THE BROWN'S Town municipal bus park in St. Ann is losing thousands of dollars
monthly…lost over $3,000 in May, and Mayor Giscombe disclosed in a statement
today that much of the ongoing loss was accumulated by huge garbage clean-up bills.
He says the excessive garbage results from too much illegal selling at the bus park,
which is also being used as a prime illegal municipal garbage dump.58
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Michael Witter, “The Role of Higglers/Sidewalk Vendors/Informal Commercial Traders in the Development of
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According to the World Bank, Jamaica has an uncompetitive high cost economy, with a
fairly high ratio of taxes (25-26 percent) and high wages in the formal sector, which has reduced
demand for labor in the formal private
sector. Many Jamaicans feel that it is
futile to even attempt to search for a
formal job. This may explain why so
many have moved into the informal
economy to survive.
There is little incentive for
informal businesses to register and

Table 5 Jamaica Business Regulation.
Rating is measured 0-10, 10 being highest.

Criteria
Extension of Credit to Private Sector

Rating
3.7

Regulation of Business – Price Controls

4.3

Administrative Obstacles for New Businesses

4.0

Time Spent with Government Bureaucracy

1.8

Ease of Starting a New Business

4.2

Irregular Payments to Government Officials

5.0

Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2004: 105).

become formal. Table 5 highlights
Jamaica’s rankings in the 2004 Economic Freedom of the World Report for various institutional and
bureaucratic constraints facing entrepreneurs. The World Bank reported that in international
comparisons of selected governance indicators, Jamaica ranked 38 out of 100 countries for the
extent of bureaucratic red tape, which may further lessen the incentive for the informal selfemployed to legally register their businesses.
Also affecting the business environment is corruption…bribery and lack of
transparency in government contracts are considered by Jamaicans to be important
problems. Jamaica ranks poorly in perceptions of favoritism shown by government
officials towards well connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies
and contracts. This is closely linked with the pressure exerted on businesses by the
protection racket, and reflected in the high perceived costs imposed on businesses by
organized crime (such as racketeering and extortion).59

59

World Bank, The Road to Sustained Growth in Jamaica (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), 117.
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III. Access to Property Right-Based Infrastructure
Police Protection
Those who work in the informal sector, especially women, are vulnerable to theft and
extortion. Because they are not operating legally
registered businesses, they are naturally reluctant to
seek protection from police or the court system. Often
they must resort to bribery to police or suffer fines
and confiscation of their goods. If they become
victims of crime, it is doubtful that they would report
the crime to the police. In a survey of 200 Kingston
informal businesses, 15 percent of respondents stated

Table 6. Summary of Most Significant
Problem Experienced by Workers in the
Kingston Informal Sector.
Most Significant Problem

Percentage

Slow Business

31.5%

Low Income

17.0%

Police Harassment

15.0%

Inflation

13.5%

Competition

8.5%

Poor Transportation

5.0%

No Shelter

3.0%

Long Working Hours

2.0%

No Problems

1.5%

Other Problems
Source: Jalloul (1988: 105).

3.0%

that police harassment was their most significant problem (see Table 6). During the 1980s, official
Jamaican government policy was to clear all of Kingston’s streets of informal sector vendors by
1990, for the purpose of urban beautification to lure foreign investment.60 As police attempted to
enforce this policy, tensions worsened.
Victoria Durant-Gonzalez is an anthropologist who lived amongst higglers for eighteen
months to study their way of life. She found that many higglers spend four days a week gathering
and buying produce in the rural communities where they live, and then travel to Kingston for the
remaining three days a week to sell their goods. They deal with inadequate transport, and unsanitary
and unsafe conditions. “They sleep at the market in conditions that are extremely harsh and
inadequate, when the service they perform as major food distributors for the nation is considered.
Women are to be seen sleeping on cold cement floors, on top of boxes, or nodding off while sitting
on stools. Some protection from guards is available, but it is minimal; as a result the higglers are

Page 28 of 85

constantly exposed to thieves and violence.”61 For those who work in the informal economy, police
crackdowns, rather than protection, are frequent. A Jamaica Gleaner news story illustrates the clash
between police and street vendors, and the determination felt by each side:
Cops crack down on illegal vending
THE RURAL town of Christiana was paid a visit by the members of the anti-vending
unit in the Jamaica Constabulary Force…sent scores of vendors, who were peddling
their wares on Wildman Street and in the yard of the market, running in various
directions as they made attempts to prevent their goods from being seized. A number
of vendors voiced their disgust with the frequent visits being paid by the anti-vending
unit. "Dem come here yesterday, cut up the stalls them, run we into the market, seize
some of us goods and them still come back today. What we do why them coming here
so often?” questioned one vendor… Sergeant Farquharson, of the Island Special
Constabulary Force (ISCF), based at Harman Barracks, told The Gleaner … that the
unit would continue to visit Christiana, Spaldings and all towns where street vending
is a problem until the illegal practice is stamped out.62

Safe Transportation and Roads:
Transportation available to Jamaicans is mostly operated informally, outside formal
regulation, licensing and taxation. Jamaicans can’t count on predictable timetables or regular routes
because drivers change routes to avoid police. Financial incentives motivate drivers to load vehicles
to above-capacity, with passengers sometimes hanging out of open bus doors or children sitting in
open taxi trunks. These vehicles are then driven at aggressive speeds on dangerous road conditions.
A study of Jamaica’s informal transportation system concluded: “the large number of serious road
accidents involving minibuses, as well as the tragic deaths of school-children who fell from overcrowded buses, further served to underline the need for improvement in the system.”63
Drivers often carry weapons (machetes or guns) for protection, particularly when driving
through unsafe neighborhoods at night. An additional danger comes from legal taxi operators who
60
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61
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pay the fees for licensing and insurance and resent the loss of passengers to cheaper illegal taxis. At
times this tension erupts into open conflict. Drivers regularly use intimidation and violence towards
competing drivers, often parking minibuses in such a way to block other vehicles to load up their
passengers first. Bus parks are some of the most violent places in Jamaica, yet they are an
unavoidable reality for most commuters, including school children.
Massive uncontrolled informal housing developments result in the government’s inability to
plan and zone
roads. Poor roads
are extremely
vulnerable to
flooding, and
such conditions
affect everyone.
People can’t get
to work, and
children can’t get

Figure 3. Poor road conditions due to unplanned development.
Photograph by Collin Reid, Associated Press, 2002.

to school. Parents
sacrifice to send their children to the best schools, often requiring travel over long distances. Drivers
will tend to charge excessive fairs or even refuse to go into some communities. It is common for
people who work in Kingston to commute daily from places as distant as Mandeville (65 miles to

63

Patricia Anderson and Hilary Bailey, Mini Bus Ride: a Journey through the Informal Sector of Kingston’s Mass
Transportation System (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West
Indies, 1987), i.
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the west), despite poor road conditions.64 Transportation costs for some shanty town dwellers have
reached as high as 44 percent of take home pay.65
Poor roads create severe problems for the agriculture industry. The following account
describes the inefficient methods that farmers are relegated to due to poor road infrastructure:
The farmers have developed ways of adjusting …(a) in the event of a landslide they
have to work as a group to clear the roads in order to return to normality as soon as
possible (b) they stay overnight in local marketplaces (c) they pool their
transportation of produce to the marketplace (d) they rely on home made handcart
and donkeys; and they transport produce on their heads along rugged paths.66

The combined factors of poor roads, unregulated transportation, lawlessness and crime not
only affect the ability to move people and goods, but affect the tourism industry. Jamaica’s economy
is heavily dependent on tourism. Note the travel warning that the U.S. Department of State provides
to U.S. citizens considering travel to Jamaica:
Nighttime driving is especially dangerous and should be avoided whenever possible.
As noted above in the section on Crime, public buses are often overcrowded and
they are frequently a venue of crime. Travelers who use taxicabs should take only
licensed taxicabs having red-and-white PP license plates… Most roads are paved, but
suffer from ill repair, inadequate signage and poor traffic control markings. City roads
are often subject to poorly marked construction zones, pedestrians, bicyclists, and,
occasionally, livestock. Street corners are frequented by peddlers, window washers,
and beggars walking among stopped cars.67

Physical Infrastructure and Utilities:
Alan Eyre, a Geographer who has conducted multiple case studies of informal housing
provided the following description of a Kingston informal community:
…basic amenities and services are uneconomical, temporary and piecemeal in nature,
and inefficient in operation. Laments are frequent and often justified about water,
sewage, flood control, garbage disposal, and lighting. There is no fire station, and the
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police operate from a converted trailer. Storm water floods homes irregularly but
seriously. Public transportation is a nightmare, as none originates in the settlement.
Consequently buses pass through in an already grossly overcrowded condition.
Residents state that three hours is not an unusual length of time to wait in a morning
for transportation to school or to work.68

Informal housing developments are built outside the regulatory environment, and lack
proper zoning, water and sewage infrastructure. A USAID survey of 677 informal households in
Kingston found that the factors cited most frequently as things that respondents disliked about
where they lived were: violence, flies pollution, garbage and rats, with violence being cited in all areas
surveyed.69 The survey found that although 90 percent of the residents obtain water from the public
water supply in one way or another, 35 percent accessed water piped into shared yards rather than
into their homes. The Urban Institute found that there are some cases where water must be carried
three miles from the nearest standpipe, and in other cases one standpipe may serve as many as 2000
people.70 Thirty percent of the households shared bathing facilities, and 45 percent of households
relied on toilets used by sixteen people or more. A heavy reliance on pit latrines (47 percent) has
increased ground water pollution.71
Given the lack of clear ownership and addresses for billing and payment collection, utility
companies find it difficult to provide services to informal housing developments. At times utility
companies threaten to withdraw completely from specific urban neighborhoods due to widespread
utility theft, as illustrated by a news story in The Jamaica Gleaner:
JPSCo cuts 300 illegal connections
THE JAMAICA Public Service Company (JPSCo) disconnected nearly 300 illegal
electrical connections…"For years we have been trying to get rid of illegal
connections. What we have now is a more concerted effort to continuously carry out
raids to deter people from connecting illegally and reduce the propensity for future
68
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electricity thieves," Major George Kates, General Manager of JPSCo's Asset
Protection Department said. … "In Montego Bay there are softer areas where we can
go without police but there are some no-go terrains where we just can't go unless we
have a strong detachment of police."72

Chapter Conclusion
The research gathered in this chapter demonstrates the extent of the widespread absence of
property rights in Jamaica. It affects Jamaicans’ everyday quality of life regarding housing, work,
security, and public infrastructure. By most estimates, 50-70 percent of housing is outside the legal
regulatory structure, as well as approximately 50 percent of the labor force. Without protection of
their property, many Jamaicans are more vulnerable to crime, inadequate housing and infrastructure,
and unprotected labor. Chapter four explores the relationship between this widespread lack of
property rights and economic underdevelopment in Jamaica.
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CHAPTER 4: HOW THE ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS INHIBITS
DEVELOPMENT IN JAMAICA
Economic Growth in Jamaica over the last Several Decades
There is a rapidly growing consensus that economic growth remains the best antipoverty
program in the world. 73 “Evidence suggests that growth is by far the most effective way of
alleviating poverty in the developing world. With growth comes rising incomes…food, medical care
and clothing…tax revenues that can be spent on public goods like clean water and decent schools.”74
Between 1952 and 1972, Jamaica was the model of successful development and growth.
Much of this success can be attributed to several key economic driver industries. Jamaica was the
world’s leading producer of bauxite and aluminum, which experienced tremendous growth during
and post WWII, tourism was flourishing, as was business and investor confidence. With a real GDP
growth of more than six percent a year, Jamaica was considered an economic miracle. 75
This pattern changed dramatically in 1972, after which point Jamaica’s growth rate has been
negligible. Table 7 provides data on Jamaica’s recent growth rate, which the World Bank
summarizes: “measured GDP growth has been disappointing since 1972, and was negligible over the
1990s despite high measured rates of investment.”76
Table 7. Jamaica and GDP
Year
1990
GDP growth,
annual % change
5.5

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Avg 95-02

0.5

-1.3

-2.0

-0.5

-0.4

0.7

1.7

1.0

0.0

Source: World Bank (2004: 12 Table I)

This sudden change in growth can partially be explained by external macroeconomic and
geopolitical conditions. As an import-dependent, monocrop economy (cane sugar), Jamaica has
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always been vulnerable and dependent on external conditions. As markets have opened over the last
several decades, the world began buying sugar from other Latin American countries that produced
less expensive beets sugar rather than from cane. Energy shocks have had a dramatic effect on
Jamaica; a sudden rise in the price of oil in 1974 increased the nation’s energy import bill from J$65
million to J$177 million.77
During the Cold War era, Jamaica’s domestic politics affected its relationship with its
primary benefactor, the United States. Michael Manley’s PNP party, a democratic socialist regime,
took office in 1972. Manley’s administration flirted with Cuban style socialism, resulting in severe
repercussions for Jamaica’s economy. Capital flight ensued, with an estimated net private capital
outflow of US $412 million between 1976 and 1980.78 As investment dwindled, Jamaica’s
relationship with Washington D.C. became strained. Widespread political unrest, crime and violence
brought about a decline in tourism. Additionally, Manley imposed a bauxite levy that resulted in U.S.
aluminum companies such as Alcoa replacing Jamaica with Australian suppliers of bauxite.79
During Manley’s regime, Jamaica failed IMF financial performance tests and loans were
suspended. Between 1977 and 1990 there were a series of complimentary and interlocking
agreements: IMF agreements, World Bank structural adjustment loans, sector adjustment loans and
programs, IDB adjustment loans and USAID conditionality. Conditionality typically hinged around
market liberalization and austerity measures, to which the Marxist-Leninist leaning Manley regime
was unreceptive.
The general election of 1980 swept Edward Seaga’s JLP party into power, more closely
aligned with capitalism. Cuban diplomats were expelled, relations resumed with Washington D.C.,
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and investment began to seep back into Jamaica. Reagan himself personally petitioned U.S.
investment banks and the private sector to take an interest in Jamaica. Interestingly, the IMF did not
impose the same harsh conditionality on Seaga’s regime as it enforced upon Manley’s socialist
government in the 1970’s.80 In fact, “…in the late 1980s when the IMF required the Jamaican
government to increase capital reserves held in banks, USAID lent Jamaica millions of dollars to
pass the IMF tests.”81 Despite the regime change, Seaga’s regime inherited a “…virtually insolvent
economy.”82 Despite significant economic reforms that met the approval of the IMF, at best Seaga’s
government “…managed to arrest Jamaica’s economic deterioration. But the recovery was far from
spectacular.”83 Macroeconomic conditions continued to haunt Jamaica, particularly the fall in world
demand for aluminum.
In the mid 90’s, Jamaica experienced a severe financial crisis attributed to speculative lending
paired with weak institutions and poor credit decisions. Mass insolvencies were bailed out by the
Government of Jamaica, leading to the enormous government debt of 150 percent of GDP. Today
Jamaica has one of the highest debt ratios in the world, and has never recovered from its financial
crisis.84
At present, the World Bank attributes Jamaica’s poor growth performance to several factors:
lack of competitiveness due to a high government debt burden, high costs due to soaring crime
rates, an adverse external climate, an internal financial crisis, and financial liberalization
unaccompanied by appropriate regulatory strengthening. Although the World Bank’s conclusions do
not make an overt connection to property rights, the relationship becomes apparent with a closer
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analysis. The remainder of this chapter examines how the absence of a functioning and enforced
property rights system affects access to credit, corruption, business investment climate, and
government ability to collect taxes, all of which negatively affect growth.

Property Rights and Access to Credit
Based on studies of small businesses in Jamaica, it is clear that there is severely limited access to
credit. Without credit, businesses are not able to invest in and expand their operations, hire
employees, or buy needed materials to turn into products. 85 This widespread lack of credit is closely
related to the absence of property rights. A land title is typically required by banks as secure
collateral for loans. Without collateral, banks are highly unlikely to take on the risk of a loan.
In de Soto’s study of the informal economy, he predicts that without property rights and access
to credit, small businesses are relegated to small local circles of trust where they get credit from their
vendors and where they in turn provide credit to trusted local customers. LeFranc’s study of 866
Jamaican higglers found this to be the case; 89 percent of higglers operated within a 10 mile radius,
and their only credit came from trusted friends and their vendors, not from banks.86
A comparative study of small business formation in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad concluded
that “Jamaica has been the least hospital state to small enterprise development”87 particularly due to
the lack of access to credit from commercial lenders. The study reported that amongst the small
businesses participating in the survey, 80 percent of capital came from the owner’s savings, relatives
or friends, and only 13.9 percent of capital came from commercial bank lending. A separate survey
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of 866 higglers in Kingston found that only four percent of the respondents relied on banks and
formal lending institutions because credit simply was not available to them. Rather, they relied on
their own savings, loans from family or friends, or credit from the supplier of goods.88 Similarly, a
survey of 200 self-employed Kingston workers found that “The most expressed need was for smallscale loans to expand stock and enlarge the businesses; none of those in the study was able to meet
that need.”89
There are several reasons why credit is not widely available. First, Jamaica’s high debt burden
ties up most investment capital and prevents small business loans from being able to jumpstart
private sector growth. Jamaica’s debt, at 150 percent of GDP, is amongst the highest ratios in the
world, which affects the availability of credit to the private sector. The World Bank explains that
“…with high and relatively risk-free returns on government debt, banks have become more
reluctant to lend to private firms, especially small firms and start-ups, which constrains a potentially
vibrant source of GDP and export growth.”90
A second factor affecting access to credit is a lack of collateral when property such as homes,
land or business assets is not legally documented. Banks are unlikely to provide credit without secure
collateral. For example, as Jamaica opened its agricultural markets to free trade, farmers were unable
to borrow against their land to modernize and compete because they did not have land titles as
collateral.91 A survey of 677 informal Kingston households concluded:
The main constraint resulting from lack of formal employment is that it tends to
make it extremely difficult to access formal financial systems for credit purposes.
Insurance, mortgage financing, income generating loans, and overdrafts are not
88
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eagerly extended to those without proof of “respectable” i.e. formal employment
status…Few formal financial institutions for instance take their services to the
informal markets where most of the informal sector’s economic activity takes place.92

Banks are unwilling to take on high risk. Without legally registered titles there is no mechanism
or authority to foreclose or evict those who do not pay their mortgages. The lack of a credit
reporting system creates moral hazard; those who default do not face risk or consequences. With
payments based on an honor system it is not surprising that 94 percent of NHT (National Housing
Trust) government housing scheme mortgages were not up to date in 1988 and 28 percent were one
year or more in default.
Without widespread credit, Jamaica has been unable to develop a flourishing mortgage market.
Mortgage markets are critical to a functioning economy, providing a credit engine for the
construction industry to grow, as well as providing a method for savings and investment as
homeowners build equity over time.
In sum, a widespread absence of property rights has affected access to credit in Jamaica, creating
repercussions that negatively affecting growth. Without credit, there is less investment in business
growth and jobs, preventing businesses from enlarging beyond their respective community
environments.
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Property Rights, Corruption and Crime
See them fighting for power
But they know not the hour
So they bribing with
Their guns, spare-parts and money
Trying to belittle our integrity
They say what we know
Is just what they teach us
Thru political strategy
They keep us hungry
When you gonna get some food
Your brother got to be your enemy
-Bob Marley93

Corruption is generally regarded as one of the most serious obstacles to development, and
Jamaica is no exception. On the surface Jamaica appears to have a functioning democracy, with two
parties, freedom of speech, and a 2002 election that was recognized as fair by the Carter Center.94
However, clientelism more accurately describes Jamaica’s political system. Clientelism is a form of
institutional machine politics, an unofficial system of political organization based on patronage, the
spoils system, and behind-the-scenes control behind the facade of a representative democracy. A
dissertation study of Kingston’s political patronage system explained: “Clientelist politics tend to
develop when there is a small elite group with access to material resources and a large group in need
of material relief.”95
In the absence of legally secure property rights for land, homes and business property, the
political patronage system and entrenched government corruption fills the void with distribution of
homes and jobs, based on an exchange of favors, such as voting for specific political parties.
Researchers Bratton and Van de Wall distinguished an African neopatrimonial regime type where
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the executive maintains authority by dispensing personal patronage.96 This is particularly relevant to
Jamaica given its historical and cultural African legacy and a population that is 91 percent of African
heritage. Jamaicans themselves commonly refer to their clientelistic system as political tribalism.
Numerous studies on political corruption in Jamaica provide detailed accounts:
What emerged in Jamaica in the 1950s and 1960s, despite superficial similarities to
the political norms of Western liberal democracy, was a clientelistic style of politics,
whereby the political elite functioned as brokers, channeling state patronage both to
the depressed masses and to the capitalist class.97
Most important, the PNP (People’s National Party) and JLP (Jamaican Labour Party)
are both committed to the intensive use of political patronage; that is to say, the
scarce benefits that flow from government policies and expenditure in the form of
jobs, housing, contracts, and so on should be allocated to party supporters. In a
sense, it is possible to view the two-party system in Jamaica as a continuing struggle
between rival patronage machines (emphasis added). 98
Provision of homes and jobs became a major political exercise carried out for the
benefit of supporters of the victorious party.99

In reality, there is little difference between Jamaica’s two parties. There is little intra-party
competition and both are famous for being heavily and openly engaged in patronage. This may
explain why no grassroots efforts or political pressure groups exist in Jamaica to pressure for
reforms that make property rights more accessible. As a study of Kingston’s political dons finds,
“The ability to contain radicalism either by absorbing it, repressing it, or ensuring that it never
surfaces has been one of the key strengths of the Jamaican elite. The political parties have played the
crucial role in ensuring that this occurs, and clientelism has been a key element in this strategy.”100
There is evidence that clientelistic systems lead to decreased mobilization and increased territorialism

96

Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa” World
Politics 46 (July 1994).
97
Anthony Payne, Charting Caribbean Development (Gainesville, FL: The University Press of Florida, 2001), 67.
98
Carl Stone and Stanislaw Wellisz, “Jamaica” in Five Small Open Economies: A World Bank Study, Ronald
Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 145.
99
Alan Eyre, “The Effects of Political Terrorism on the Residential Location of the Poor in the Kingston Urban
Region” Urban Geography 7 (March 1986), 228.
100
Amanda Sives, “Changing Patrons, from Politician to Drug Don: Clientelism in Downtown Kingston, Jamaica”
Latin American Perspectives 29 (May 2002), 69.

Page 41 of 85

“as the poor focus their political energies on acquiring handouts and gaining the attention of the
political bosses.”101
Jamaica’s patronage political system has a historic legacy of offering jobs, homes, local
infrastructure,
and at times
weapons, in
exchange for
loyalty or
votes.
Elections are
especially
violent times
in Jamaica
(see figure 4).

Figure 4 Military presence during elections in inner city communities.
Photograph by Andres Leighton, Associated Press, 2002.
Jamaican Army soldiers patrol the Trench Town neighborhood in Kingston, Jamaica, Tuesday,
Oct. 15, 2002 a day before the general elections. Some 25,000 police and military personnel will be
on hand during the Oct. 16 election.

Garrison communities are entire gang-controlled neighborhoods that vote as a block for a
candidate in exchange for benefits, with heavily armed badmen or dons in control.102 Bob Marley’s
lyrics describe the plight of impoverished Jamaicans caught in the crossfire of political violence.
When a Jamaican garrison neighborhood marks its borders with green JLP graffiti, PNP supporters
enter those communities on risk of their lives (see figure 5). Not unrelated, Jamaica’s pervasive high
101
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Figure 5. Political graffiti marking the JLP side of the border in an informal community in Kingston.
Photograph by Alan Eyre, 1984.

crime rates include the third highest homicide rate in the world, and looting, arson, theft, powerful
organized crime, extortion and fraud are rampant.103
The systemic problems of the absence of property rights, corruption, and vulnerability to
crime mutually reinforce each other. There is evidence that the level of patronage or clientelism
within a nation’s political system positively influences the size of the informal sector.104 A lack of
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property rights makes people more vulnerable to corruption and crime. It is the lawless zones of
squatter communities populated by informal workers that are most likely to be garrison
communities. Where they do not have access to police protection from the state, people will resort
to seeking protection from the crime underworld. Local political chieftains or drug dons fill this
void, as explained by a geographer’s survey of political terrorism in Kingston slums:
Security often becomes a paramount consideration in residential location. The choice
is often between residing in the perceived relative safety of a high density urban
location protected by organized para-military, vigilante, or private security
organizations, or living in a peripheral location which may be far from the main foci
of conflict but yet offers less protection from specifically directed terrorist attacks.105

Lacking protection for their property, lacking police security and rule of law, the poorest Jamaicans
are particularly vulnerable to the political violence that upholds a corrupt clientelistic system. There
is evidence that indicators of corruption are negatively correlated with important economic
outcomes.106 Corruption reduces efficiency, economic growth, per capita income, and affects child
mortality and literacy.107

Property Rights and Business Investment Climate
Many conditions affect investors’ decisions, including the macroeconomic climate, tax
incentives, interest rates and exchange rates. However, an absence of property rights also particularly
affects the decisions of both foreign and domestic investors in Jamaica. There is a higher risk for
investors when there is a lack of security for business property and assets, and widespread extortion
and theft. Investors must consider the risk of lower sales when prices are undercut by illegal
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businesses and higher uncertainty when there is poor infrastructure such as unsafe roads and
undependable utilities. As stated one researcher, the absence or property rights directly increases the
cost of production because of “…time spent on bribery, avoiding licenses and taxes, and seeking
private sector alternatives to public services.”108
Crime significantly creates a higher cost for doing business, requiring most businesses to
employ private security guards or succumb to the pressure exerted by organized crime to utilize their
protection racket. The World Bank estimates that an improvement in Jamaica’s rule of law to that of
the level of other Caribbean nations such as the Bahamas would lead to a 50 percent increase in
foreign investment:
Crime costs Jamaica at least 4 percent of GDP, including lost production, health
expenses, and public and private spending. In addition, exporting firms’ security costs
can be as high as 5 percent of sales, small firms’ losses due to extortion, fraud,
robbery and arson can be 9 percent of revenue, with an average of 3-6 percent for
firms in manufacturing and distribution. The costs of crime limit growth. Some 10-20
percent of firms in the business survey suggested that they may close down in the
next three years because of crime.109

These costs include elaborate accounting systems to police workers and inventory, extensive
surveillance systems, security guards and dogs, special fencing, grill works and alarm systems. Sixty
percent of large businesses use armed guards. A realistic fear of crime affects workers during their
commutes through dangerous bus parks and communities; most workers refuse to commute or
work after dark, and few businesses are able to operate second or third shifts, affecting efficiency.
Call centers that have attempted to establish operations during the night have struggled to find
employees willing to work after dark.
A case study of fruit processing companies in Jamaica provides a good example of how
vulnerable companies are to extortion and how this affects costs. Interviews reveal that proprietors
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and their foremen have been pressured by local criminal bosses time and again to make their plant
available for smuggling operations such that they must alter operations to prevent tampering with
the product. They report a “constant fear of drug smuggling.”110 The plight of the fruit processing
businesses reveals how vulnerability of property affects competitiveness and the bottom line due to
increased security costs.
Legally compliant businesses must compete with tax-evading businesses that do not comply
with regulations, often operating on the sidewalk outside their storefront and undercutting their
prices. A study of Jamaica’s competitiveness that conducted interviews with employers found that
“the relative large informal sector in Jamaica is perceived as a major source of unfair competition.”111
The Jamaica Gleaner interviewed a legal business owner who complained about illegal peddlers
blocking store entrances: “when they buy the goods and just lay it out in front of the stores
customers cannot get to enter the stores, so we end up losing.”112 Another news account describes
the tension between illegal and legal vendors in a Port Antonio business district:
The mayor noted…complaints from several store operators along the William Street
strip, who have indicated that the progress of their businesses was being severely
hampered. "The vendors were plying their trade at the doorsteps of the store
operators, where these store owners were losing sales as they were prevented from
entering the stores," he said.113

Poor infrastructure such as unsafe roads and unreliable utility service affect investor’s
decisions. The World Bank’s 2004 assessment of Jamaica’s investment climate found a high cost and
inadequate coverage of infrastructure and utilities, “…particularly water and roads, and the
unreliability of power supply.”114 Interviews with business owners reveal dissatisfaction with “…a
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poor mass transit system which makes it difficult for workers to get to their jobs and results in
worker frustration.”115
It is for many of these reasons that Jamaica has lost appeal as a location for business
investment. Jamaica recently lost textile and tire production industries to lower cost countries such
as Mexico, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. As a note of caution, although FDI (foreign direct
investment) has been relatively high, it has been capital intensive investment or portfolio investment
in search of interest rate differentials, most of which has not resulted in growth or significant job
creation. For example heavy investment in Jamaica’s bauxite industry has not created enough jobs to
significantly increase employment rates.
As a result of reduced investment in business formation, there are fewer formal jobs, and
people remained trapped in a high unemployment economy where they must turn to the informal
economy to survive. In this climate of underinvestment, a middle class cannot evolve, and
development remains stagnant.

Property Rights and Tax Collection
Because of its massive informal employment base, the Jamaican government’s tax collection
ability is diminished. One research team made the remarkable finding that tax evasion is so
widespread that Jamaica has lost tax revenues equivalent to 84 percent of actual collections.116
In 2004, a public finance team assigned to make recommendations for tax reform in Jamaica
noted that “tax evasion is particularly problematic for the self-employed sector, where up to 90
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percent of the self-employed escape the system of direct taxes.”117 The study analyzed the tax
payments made by 4,084 formal workers and 932 self-employed informal workers and found that
only 11 percent of the self-employed filed a tax return. The researchers estimated that across the
board, undeclared income from Jamaica’s self-employed is J$600 million and that the actual tax base
is only two-thirds of its potential.118
The loss of revenues negatively affects the government’s ability to finance needed infrastructure
and social capital. The government of Jamaica faces enormous pressure in paying down a debt
burden that is 150% of GDP, one of the highest in the world, while maintaining a social safety net
and stimulating growth in their economy:
The share of government spending in the social sectors has fallen from 26% in
FY1997/98 to 18% in FY2000/01, while the share devoted to debt management has
increased from 49% to 58.2% during the same period. This situation severely limits the
ability of the government to channel the required resources to the provision of social
services, and the strengthening of the safety net.119

Given its enormous debt, many of Jamaica’s social programs and interventions are funded by
outside sources such as loans from the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and
western donor countries. If Jamaica did not suffer from such widespread tax evasion, perhaps it
would not be as dependent on outside resources.
As a result of widespread tax evasion, taxes in Jamaica are unjustly regressive rather than
progressively distributed. The narrow base of formal workers who are compliant with tax regulation
shoulder the bulk of Jamaica’s tax revenues. The fact that the majority of Jamaicans operates outside
the legal system and do not pay taxes generates gross inequalities and inefficiencies in the income tax
system. This severely affects growth in Jamaica by unfairly penalizing those few who are tax
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compliant. In effect, it “discourages savings, investment, and work effort, while leading to capital
(and human) flight.”120

Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated a relationship between the absence of property rights in Jamaica
and underdevelopment. Although certainly macroeconomic and external geopolitical circumstances
strongly affect Jamaica’s growth, domestic property-rights related factors such as access to credit,
corruption, business investment climate, and government ability to collect taxes all clearly affect
Jamaica’s inability to spur growth and development.

120

Ibid, 867.

Page 49 of 85

CHAPTER 5: THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE: THE INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL
POLICY ENVIRONMENT

International Policy Environment
Most multilateral governance organizations and bilateral donor agencies are well aware of the
problems associated with a widespread absence of property rights.121 The World Bank is probably
the most active, sponsoring some of the most comprehensive research on the issue.122 Appendix
VII contains a matrix of the World Bank’s direct policy recommendations to Jamaica regarding
property rights. USAID has sponsored research of informal housing and tax reform in Jamaica.123
The USAID-funded Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative (Appendix III) contains an online
database and discussion boards for development and government professionals to share best
practices towards establishing property rights.124 The Inter-American Development Bank’s
Multilateral Investment Fund sponsors a cross-cutting project initiative entitled “Promoting
Effective Property Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean” (see Appendix IV). The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has conducted investigations of property rights as well.125
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The International Labour Organization (ILO) was one of the first multilateral institutions to
research the problem of property rights in 1977.126 In fact, a search within their informal economy
database returns 547 articles related to property rights. The ILO has funded specific research of
Jamaica’s informal economy.127
Similarly, a search of the OECD website reveals 175 research articles written on the informal
economy, as well as a comparative case study of regulation and the informal economies in Jamaica
and Ecuador.128
The United Nation Development Program’s 2004 Assessment of Development Results in Jamaica
made specific recommendations related to the massive informal economy129 and has also funded
land tenure research.130 In January 2006 the UNDP announced the formulation of a new
commission, the High Level Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. The commission
will be chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Peruvian economist
Hernando de Soto. The Commission is charged with expanding access to property rights to the poor
and marginalized segments of society. See Appendix II for the commission’s concept paper and
mission.
Although it is clear that multilateral governance and development organizations have
conducted substantial research on property rights some questions remain. Are the study findings and
recommendations both realistic and accessible to domestic government policy makers? Are the
research findings then being applied in the form of funding priorities, interventions and programs?
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It appears that although studies, papers and conferences are plentiful, actual funded interventions
and programs are sporadic.
After surveying all of the agencies for programs or interventions, there appears to be two
property rights interventions in Jamaica. Since 1999, the Jamaican government and the InterAmerican Development Bank provide funding for a land title pilot project at a cost of US$12
million. The Land Administration and Management Programme (LAMP) strategically targets the
informal sector. LAMP is intended to transform the informal sector in one parish by creating a more
affordable and accessible land title registration system.131 Although the project moves Jamaica a step
closer to providing more accessible property rights, it is important to note that it is a pilot project
and benefits a small segment of the population in one parish on the island. Additionally, the ILO has
funded employment training programs targeted at informal workers.132 Follow up research has found
discouragement amongst participants who completed the training, because of the unavailability of
formal employment despite their newly acquired skills.133
Although USAID has substantially funded housing programs intended for low income
Jamaicans, homes and mortgages are awarded to middle income Jamaicans rather than those with
the most need. This misallocation of targeted funding is due to property rights. Although
government housing schemes were intended for low-income Jamaicans, National Housing Trust
(NHT) officers typically offer housing to those who work in the formal sector because of their
ability to make automatic payroll deduction for mortgage payments, lessening the risk of default.
Because the majority of low-income Jamaicans employed in the informal economy are paid in cash,
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automatic payroll deduction is not feasible. Low income Jamaicans are therefore more likely to be
turned down for NHT housing defeating the purpose of USAID’s program.134
Why more property rights interventions are not funded in Jamaica is murky. It could be that
Jamaica has not applied for funding, or perhaps because this is a newly recognized development
issue. Whatever the reason, the end result is that despite enormous amounts of research,
conferences, and publications there is little donor investment in programs to reform Jamaica’s
property rights dilemma.

Jamaican Civic and Nonprofit Organizations and Property Rights:
International Non-Government Organizations (INGOs) and non-profits based in Jamaica
also seem to ignore property rights. In the author’s two years experience of doing development work
in Jamaica, only one INGO worked on property rights issues: Habitat for Humanity International
Jamaica (HFHJ).
HFHJ’s program has been in jeopardy due to the widespread lack of land titles. The
organization funds homes for the needy based on no-interest, at-cost revolving mortgages. The
revolving fund is intended to be used for building new homes when families pay off their mortgages.
Habitat had difficulties collecting mortgage payments from families because without land titles, loans
were unsecured. With no threat of foreclosure families were not paying into the revolving fund. In
2003, to avoid endangering their operations in Jamaica, the director made the strategic decision to
recruit pro bono attorneys to work closely with housing applicants to obtain titles to land before
mortgage contracts were written. In the author’s experience, Habitat is the only INGO or nonprofit
in Jamaica that directly worked on property rights issues. It is possible that INGOs are not working
on the issue of property rights reform because funding is contingent upon charity and voluntary
134
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donations. It may be the case that other humanitarian issues that are more sympathetic and
marketable crowd out property rights for funding priorities.
In contrast, Jamaican civic associations are fairly active in dealing with informal vendors,
although this relationship is often hostile. The Jamaica Chamber of Commerce and the United
Vendor’s Association have both lobbied the GOJ to remove informal vendors from busy market
areas in downtown Kingston.135 At times there is cooperation with the Jamaica Vendors, Higglers
and Markets Association, but this often degenerates into conflict. The relationship between the two
associations is not always cooperative ― especially when higglers experience a drop in sales when
they are forcibly removed from profitably byways to zoned areas that are more out of the way.
Threats of violence, burning and looting inevitably bring police intervention. As one illegal vendor
argued in protest, “The market thing just not going to work out. You go in there (allotted markets),
and nobody not coming in. Business good right out here. So, all the people who going and coming
from country, who just come off the bus and who have other business on King Street, is here so
things must catch dem eye.”136 The City of Kingston has spent more than $20 million Jamaican to
refurbish markets to house vendors, but these new-look facilities have remained relatively empty.137

Government of Jamaica Policy
The Government of Jamaica’s (GOJ) response to the widespread lack of property rights
appears sporadic and inadequate. Few policies appear to be in place that recognize or attempt to
resolve property rights issues. This inaction is typical of developing countries. In a recent study,
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researchers examined the policy priorities of governments throughout the 1990’s and found that
little attention has been given to the issue of informal economies.138
The World Bank’s opinion of the GOJ policy response is one of concern: “A fundamental
problem with Jamaica's past pattern of development is that it has not gone far enough in breaking
down the dualistic economy. A sharp contrast remains between the low-wage, capital-starved, largely
informal or rural sectors and the capital-intensive, high wage sectors.”139 In the Planning Institute of
Jamaica’s much acclaimed Survey of Living Conditions 2002 ― which is intended to be a comprehensive
overview of national social issues ― there is no connection or mention of social problems and their
relationship to property rights or even that a large informal sector exists.
Geographer Alan Eyre conducted five case studies of the GOJ response to informal housing
and found the official response severely lacking. At best “a few intellectuals and low-level
functionaries from government and the private sector met from time to time to discuss the
problem” but that overall, “the attitude of government, both JLP and PNP, was one of total
disinterest and unconcern.”140 Table 8
illustrates the results from a survey of 791

Table 8. Level of Government’s Interest in Squatters’
Problems
Perceived level of interest
Percentage
A great deal of interest

squatters in Jamaica who tend to perceive the

5.3

Some interest

28.3

government as not interested in property rights

No interest at all

61.4

issues.

Don’t know

There are occasional public

4.9

Source: Tindigarukayo, J. (2002: 109)

announcements by the GOJ related to property rights issues. For example, in 1998, a newly
announced Micro-Sector Policy intended to shore up small businesses stated that “the GOJ intends
137
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to provide the framework for the expansion and development of the micro-sector to enhance its
contribution to economic growth."141 The strategy outlined a commitment to extend credit to microenterprises, most of which are informal:
To increase access to credit for individuals in the sector at the institutional level and at
the product level. At the institutional level, Government will strengthen and maintain
specialized credit institutions such as the People's Co-operative Bank and MIDA. In
terms of products, these should be broadened to include a credit guarantee scheme, small
loan fund and non-collateral lending ensuring that the credit delivery system is more
efficient and effective.142

The GOJ established the Micro Investment Development Agency (MIDA) to provide low
interest credit to small businesses. In 2004, MIDA reported their expectation to “disburse $200
million in new loans to finance approximately 2,080 micro businesses that should create close to
2,810 jobs in various sectors of the economy.”143 As far as the results, it is unclear whether credit has
been made more available since that time. A 1996 IADB study of microenterprise development in
Jamaica concluded that the “credit granting institutions are far from financial self-sufficiency and the
stronger ones have only reached the middle and upper strata of the micro and small business
class.”144 The World Bank’s 2004 Road to Sustained Growth in Jamaica observed that access to credit
remains severely limited.145 In 2004 the author personally worked with a dozen small informal
business owners to help them write business plans and apply for small loans, yet none of them were
successful in obtaining financing from micro-credit institutions or from commercial banks. All
found the process difficult ― if not impossible ― primarily because they lacked collateral.
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A contemporary reader would be hard pressed to find recent speeches and newspaper
accounts of politician’s directives that reveal any significant attention to property rights. PNP
Presidential candidate and current Minister of Finance Dr. Omar Davies is campaigning on a
platform that emphasizes microenterprises and “self-empowerment,” with a commitment to
providing better access to credit.146 In his presentation of the 2005 budget to parliament Davies
acknowledged that the informal economy affects widespread tax evasion, and announced tax reform
plans to widen Jamaica’s tax base. 147 The other candidates do not appear to be campaigning on
property-rights related issues.
The most active response of the GOJ towards property rights has been punitive. Substantial
financial resources have been spent attempting to remove vendors148 and relocate squatters or force
evictions from informal housing.149
To conclude, it appears that GOJ policy towards property rights has been piecemeal, limited
and concentrated in four areas: the LAMP pilot project for land titles, a tax reform plan targeted at
widening the tax base, limited microcredit extended to informal businesses and punitive actions that
remove informal vendors from the street and informal squatters from their communities.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
Policy Recommendations
Based on the findings in this research, The Government of Jamaica is urged to consider
three policy recommendations:
•
•
•

Create a task force on property rights reform
Reform the political patronage system
Creatively seek funding and resources

Chapter Four demonstrated that Jamaica can no longer afford to ignore the connection between a
widespread absence of property rights and underdevelopment. Chapter Five established that Jamaica
is typical of most developing nations in regards to property rights. As long as GOJ policy related to
property rights continues to be sporadic and punitive, the status quo will be reinforced, leaving the
masses trapped outside the legal structure.
Alternatively, contemporary development research is pioneering more transformational
approaches. For the first time, international development funding agencies, domestic governments
(such as Thailand, Peru and Egypt), and INGOs such as Habitat for Humanity are recognizing and
addressing the informal sector. By proactively taking on the problems of the informal sector now,
Jamaica has a window opportunity to be in the forefront of the Caribbean economy. The GOJ may
apply for funding and assistance from development agencies such as the World Bank, or the U.S.
Millennium Challenge Account fund, for example. As the Prime Minister and her Cabinet address
the root causes of a widespread absence of property rights masses of Jamaicans will be empowered
to join the legal economy. They can be free to develop capital, small businesses, pay taxes and
transform the economy from one dependent on external income sources and create its own
sustainable wealth and development.
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Recommendation I: Create a Task Force on Property Rights Reform
The Prime Minister is urged to establish a task force on property rights reform made up of
diverse and credible members reflecting all of the stakeholder interest groups: illegal business owners
and squatters, legal business owners, bankers, INGO representatives and others. The task force
should be charged with creating methods to research Jamaica’s informal sector, including
determining its size, lost tax revenues and defining participants and interactions within the economy.
The task force should hold publicized town meetings to raise awareness that social and economic
problems are related to property rights, and to solicit input from Jamaicans.
The task force should closely examine current regulations and government ministries and
how they affect extralegals. Reforms should be researched to make legality more affordable and
inclusive. From the point of view of economists, the size of the informal sector is explained by the
heavy regulatory burden on legal businesses (e.g. taxes, red tape), which provide incentives to
extralegal businesses to supply goods at a lower cost.150 Therefore, policy that reduces the regulatory
burden will reduce the demand for goods and services sold in the informal economy.151
Policy implementation must include compromises and attempt to minimize disruption to the
economy and society. As the task force weighs the costs and benefits of regularization and
enforcement of rule of law, they must be careful. It is important to acknowledge that despite the
many problems of the informal economy, there are also benefits. The informal economy provides
150
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low cost goods and jobs and is a source of competition that provides entrepreneurial experience to
the workforce. It provides a platform for business creation despite corruption and bureaucratic
obstacles. Therefore, actions should avoid being so punitive that they negatively affect the
productive qualities of the informal sector. The goal should be to regularize ― not to stamp out ―
small businesses.
Based on their findings, the task force should draft policy solutions that reform taxation
regulation, criminal justice policy and labor policy. Reforms should simplify red tape that hinders
legality and reduce steps and fees so that legal land titles and business registration is within the grasp
of the majority of Jamaicans instead of only the elite few who are in the propertied class.
The task force should also research how to strengthen property rights institutions such as
banking, insurance and rule of law ― without which foreign capital will not invest in Jamaica, and
neither will Jamaicans. The task force should set measurable goals. For example, reducing the size of
the informal economy by a fixed percent each year or increasing the number of registered land titles
by a fixed percent each year would be useful metrics.

Policy Recommendation II: Reform the Political Patronage System
Chapter Four demonstrated that in the absence of legally secure property rights for land,
homes and business property, the political patronage system and entrenched government corruption
will fill the void with distribution of homes and jobs ― based on an exchange of favors, such as
voting for specific political parties. Current theory projects that the level of patronage or clientelism
within a nation’s political system positively influences the size of the informal sector.152 Policy
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actions that reform Jamaican’s clientelistic political system are most likely necessary, not to mention
painstakingly difficult. Jamaica must therefore ask itself “…under what conditions do governments
have the incentive to ensure the rule of law, secure property rights, and a well-functioning
bureaucracy, and more generally to serve the public interest?”153 A clientelistic political system is not
that condition. It is acknowledged that this policy recommendation is by far the most difficult of all
the solutions, will take exemplary leadership, consensus building, political willpower and selfrestraint of those in power.
In order to champion these rights, there is a need for strong leadership to combat layers of
entrenched elitist bureaucracy and corruption. Pulitzer Prize winning author Thomas Friedman
argues that India’s Manmohan Singh, China’s Deng Xiaoping, Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, and
Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev are examples of leaders who reformed their economies and policy in
order to make their nations more competitive. “They also create an environment below that makes it
very easy for their people to start businesses, raise capital and become entrepreneurs.”154
Detailed recommendations on reforming political patronage machines are outside the scope
of this thesis. Nevertheless, the strong leader who steps forward in Jamaica to combat the
clientelistic system must implement strong anti-corruption laws, transparency, and rule of law. The
GOJ should seek out those on the government payroll who are obviously living above their means
(e.g. the largest house in Kingston is owned by a police chief). Punishing the big fish sends a
message of seriousness. The GOJ needs to implement civil service reform based on merit and
accountability and reduce the “pool of rents available for bribery”155 by continuing to lower trade
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barriers, eliminate unnecessary regulations and simplify essential ones to reduce the need for citizens
to grease the wheels with bribes.

Policy Recommendation III: Creatively Seek Funding and Resources
Institution building reforms require financial resources, which are in short supply in
developing nations. Some theories link property rights to a nation’s wealth: “As countries grow
wealthier, more effort and resources are spent to define and protect property rights.”156 It is
recognized that Jamaica may not be able to finance these policy reforms without outside donor
assistance, and there are a growing number of financial resources that can be solicited for grants and
financial assistance.
Recent technological innovations in GPS, GIS and cadastral systems underscore the
importance of property rights. When these technological innovations are paired with legally
documented land ownership, new levels of intelligence gathering becomes possible. This intelligence
allows for improved military tactics and territorial control strategies where lawlessness and narcoterrorist activities typically thrive. Formal, legal land titles and records could be used for financial law
enforcement to “trace ownership to national identification numbers and then to passports,
telephone bills, etc.”157 Improved land records and mapping systems assist aerial tactics, such as
spraying to destroy cocaine crops. Land records also assist war planners in the destruction of specific
military targets and minimizing of collateral damage. Columbia has approached the U.S. military for
funds for a land mapping system as part of efforts to combat Columbia’s drug trade. Jamaica is
similarly of interest to the United States as a “major transshipment point for cocaine from South
America to North America and Europe; (and the) illicit cultivation of cannabis; corruption is a major
156
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concern; (there is) substantial money-laundering activity; (and) Colombian narcotics traffickers favor
Jamaica for illicit financial transactions.” (emphasis added)158 Jamaica may be well-served to develop
a proposal to the U.S. military to fund improvements to their land mapping system.
INGOs are a vast resource of funding and manpower. Habitat for Humanity International
has a strong interest in its homeowners' ability to acquire land titles, and has partnered with the
United Nations Development fund to assist with legalization of the poor projects. Habitat has an
active office in Kingston and would be an interested stakeholder and resource.
The new U.S. Millennium Challenge Account fund ― which may eventually replace the
USAID model ― seeks proposals from governments that include property rights reforms. A recent
news account describes Madagascar’s award of funding to work on property rights reforms:
When the Bush administration invited Madagascar a year ago to apply for aid under a
new US program, government officials here came up with a wish list of traditional
development projects: a new hospital, more school spending, aid to rice farmers. US
officials weren't impressed, writes The Wall Street Journal. "Can you convince us that this is
going to bring economic growth to reduce poverty?" asked Clay Lowery, a top official
with the Millennium Challenge Corp., the overseer of the president's program.
Madagascar's leaders couldn't. So they began meeting with groups across the country,
asking where the bottlenecks to economic progress lay. Officials kept hearing the same
two complaints from farmers and small businesspeople: They couldn't get formal title to
land because of a corrupt and decrepit bureaucracy, and they couldn't get loans because
banks were growing fat investing in government bonds. Today, Madagascar President
Marc Ravalomanana will be in Washington to attend the signing of a $110 million, fouryear aid package designed to fix those problems. It's the first grant ever under Bush's
Millennium Challenge Account program -- and a test of whether the US has found a
better way of delivering assistance. 159

The goal of the Millennium Challenge Account model is to aggressively support developing
nations toward increased accountability, and strengthen institutions. A proposal from Jamaica to
strengthen property rights is sure to be received with interest.

157

Goeffrey Demarest, Mapping Colombia: The Correlation between Land Data and Strategy (Washington, D.C.:
military strategy paper for the Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003), 4.
158
CIA World Factbook (2004).
159
“New Bush Strategy on Aid Faces Test In Madagascar,” Noticias, April 19, 2005.
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As multilateral and bilateral donor agencies are becoming more aware of the importance of
property rights for development, their programs are also becoming a source for funding. Appendices
II-VI provide more details about the following property-rights based initiatives as examples of
resources for assistance and partnerships:






The USAID-funded Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative;
The Inter-American Development Bank’s Multilateral Investment Fund sponsors the
Promoting Effective Property Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean Initiative;
UNDP has recently launched the High Level Commission on Legal Empowerment of
the Poor, charged with expanding access to property rights to marginalized segments
of society;
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector Research Center, The University of
Maryland; and
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy

Limitations and Future Research
This research assumes that the lack of access to a formal legal structure of property rights
guarantees that Jamaicans seek alternatives outside the legal structure, but that if property rights
became accessible Jamaicans would choose rule of law over anarchy and lawlessness. In the author’s
experience with development programs in Jamaica any time Jamaicans had an opportunity to
become legal affordably, they did so.
This research approach is limited in that case studies are more difficult to generalize than is
quantitative research. Further field research is warranted to provide stronger evidence of the claims
made in this study. It would be especially helpful to have more evidence concerning the apparent
lack of attention to property rights by government. Interviews and field research of government
officials, civic associations such as the Jamaica Vendors, Higglers, and Markets Association, or
community-based informal housing organizations, might illuminate whether there are vested
interests that prevent property rights reforms.
Although this research is asserting that there is a relationship between property rights and
underdevelopment in Jamaica, we do not know the strength of the relationship, or what proportion
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of underdevelopment is related to underdevelopment compared to other factors. Finally, the
findings of this research are not intended to be construed that property rights are a magic bullet
cure-all for underdevelopment. For example, a case study of a community in Argentina where half
of the homes had land titles and half did not, found evidence of positive quality of life
improvements for those with land titles. Because the people in the community did not have access
to jobs, land titles were not enough to give the residents access to credit.160 Simply implementing
land titles, for example, would not be enough if not accompanied by access to jobs.

160

Sebastian Galiani and Schargrodsky, Ernesto, “Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling” (working
paper, August 9, 2005).
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APPENDIX I

Map of Jamaica

(Source: Washington University Image Archive, Nd)
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APPENDIX II
Concept Paper and Mission for United Nation’s
High Level Commission On Legal Empowerment Of The Poor (HLCLEP):
An innovative intergovernmental initiative
Website: http://legalempowerment.undp.org/html/mission.html
The initiative to establish the HLCLEP is built on the assumption and conviction that the fight
against poverty can only be won, and the MDGs only achieved, if governments succeed in giving all
citizens, especially the poor, a stronger stake in the economy through the protections and facilitative
devices that only the rule of law can provide.
The empowering benefits of broadening the rule of law can be realized through comprehensive
reforms of laws, institutions and policies. These reforms must address specifically those aspects that
have the broadest possible benefits in the fight against poverty.
Key challenges include:
•
Making user’s and property rights accessible for all, especially the poor and marginalized,
whether communities, groups or individuals;
•
Ensuring that the user’s and property rights of the poor and marginalized can function as
means for economic and social empowerment, including obtaining credit and investment under
conditions where they are not exploited;
•
Broadening access to organizational forms that allow poor and marginalized people to
govern their rights collectively by dividing labor, combining assets, and assigning responsibilities
productively in their own enterprises.
•
The overarching objective of the Commission is to contribute strategically to the struggle to
achieve the MDGs, both globally and at the country level. In particular, the Commission’s aim is
to contribute to reducing poverty by half by 2015, and making significant progress beyond this
date.
Whereas governments all over the world are struggling with this challenge and growing numbers of
citizens and interest groups are demanding change, real success stories in implementing
comprehensive reforms that benefit the poor are rare. This suggests that more effective tools and
policies and harder efforts are needed. Concerted and focused international cooperation efforts to
provide such tools and galvanize political commitment can provide a critical contribution at a time
when policymakers around the world are increasingly focusing on and grappling with this challenge.
To that end, the Commission has a six-fold agenda:
I. To galvanize political support and commitment to a broad reform agenda for legal inclusion and
empowerment of the poor.
II. To examine ways to secure broader access to legal, fungible property rights over real and movable
assets – and thus replacing, supplementing or improving existing local or national arrangements for
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the purpose of expanding and improving their utility for bottom-up economic and social
empowerment and poverty reduction.
III. To examine ways to provide broad access to legal organizational forms suited for the poor and
that enhance opportunities for growth so that poor people can combine labor, technology, and
investment to raise productivity, limit risks and protect economic achievements; and leverage
property to access credit and capital.
IV. To investigate any conceptual gaps in linking asset security, property rights, and access to the
rule of law to wider development issues. These include conflict prevention, gender equality,
economic inclusion, governance, administration of justice, legal enforcement, identification systems,
capital formation, access to credit, provision of infrastructure -- especially land, energy, water and
affordable housing -- and other issues that will benefit poor and indigenous peoples.
V. To draw up an inventory of reforms to promote asset security, and other efforts to link the
formal and informal sector, that are based on global experiences to date and contributions from
relevant expertise and stakeholders from governments, civil society, the private sector and
international organizations from around the world.
VI. To produce a Tool Kit for policy makers as a basis for solid, demand-driven support programs
for reform at the country level. The Commission is inspired by all people around the world who are
struggling daily to make ends meet, too often in a hostile environment of confusing and
dysfunctional laws and enforcement systems—some formal and others informal. Despite the
obstacles, people show an amazing ability to get by, feed their children and aspire for better lives and
in so doing deserve our deepest respect and our full commitment.
The Commission will draw on the work of those who have substantive experience developing and
implementing complex reforms, particularly those that address legal empowerment and broadening
the rule of law for the benefit of poverty reduction. Poor and informal groups will be engaged
directly by the Commission and its working groups. The Commission will base its efforts on the best
available knowledge and a range of experiences, whether from governments, non-governmental
entities, informal sector interest organizations, international organizations, private firms or financial
bodies, and especially bottom-up approaches.
(source: United Nations, “High Level Commission On Legal Empowerment Of The Poor (HLCLEP)” Nd.)
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APPENDIX III
Inter-Summit Property System
Website: www.landnetamericas.org
Initiative Background:
The Charter of the OAS, which was signed in 1948, stipulates in Article 34 that Member States agree
to devote their utmost efforts to accomplish:
“d) Modernization of rural life and reforms leading to equitable and efficient land-tenure systems,
increased agricultural productivity, expanded use of land, diversification of production and improved
processing and marketing systems for agricultural products; and the strengthening and expansion of
the means to attain these ends.”
The Summits of the Americas Process
In 1996, property rights issues were included in the Summits of the Americas Process. Action plan
of the Summit of the Americas on Sustainable Development:
“Initiative 22. Clarify, in accordance with the legal system of each country and as necessary, land
tenure and property rights, including with respect to indigenous and other local community areas,
and identify additional steps that may be needed to improve sustainable forest management under
the various forms of land tenure, taking into account the interest of all stakeholders.”
Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago de Chile, Chile April 18-19, 1998
Property Registration Mandate from the Santiago Plan of Action
Governments will:
§Streamline and decentralize, as necessary, property registration procedures by: adopting transparent,
simplified procedures for titling and registration; disseminating information regarding these
procedures; utilizing, whenever feasible, state-of-the-art technologies for property geo-referencing,
computer-generated mapping and computerized records storage; incorporating alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms; and avoiding overlapping administrative fees for titling and registration.
§Recommend that multilateral and bilateral cooperation institutions, especially the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank, strengthen their financial and technical assistance
programs, including information exchange regarding experiences among countries, to support
simplified property registration procedures and to assure access for the poor to those systems.
§In accord with national legal frameworks, implement measures, where necessary, to protect rights
accorded to indigenous populations, as well as information programs, if needed, to assure greater
awareness of indigenous populations of their rights, in this respect.
Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec City, Canada April 20-22, 2001
In April 2001, the Heads of State and Governments of the 34 States of the Western Hemisphere
met in Quebec City, Canada at the Third Summit of the Americas. The leaders of the Hemisphere
agreed on a Declaration and Plan of Action.
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Excerpt from the Growth with Equity Mandate from the Quebec Plan of Action
Governments will:
Continue and deepen progress toward implementation of the agenda for improving property
registration established at the 1998 Santiago Summit of the Americas with particular emphasis on
regularizing informal property rights, in accordance with national legislation, to ensure that all valid
property rights are formally recognized, that disputes are resolved, and that modern legal
frameworks to legitimize property records and encourage marketable property titles are adopted; and
that these actions include the formulation of institutional, political and regulatory reforms that
would facilitate the use of property registration as a mechanism to enable property owners to access
credit and allow commercial banks and MDBs to expand their customer base among lower income
sectors; promote greater cooperation and exchange of information and technology to modernize the
systems of registry and cadastre in the Hemisphere, and also request multilateral and bilateral
cooperation institutions to continue supporting and strengthening, in a complementary manner,
their financial and technical assistance programs.
Special Summit of the Americas, Monterrey, Mexico January 12-13, 2004
During the Special Summit of the Americas that took place January 12-13 in Monterrey, Mexico, the
Heads of State gathered together to agree on a new Declaration.
Excerpt from the Declaration of Nuevo León:
We recognize that legally secure property rights are one of the essential elements for economic
growth, since proof of ownership helps people to obtain loans and start businesses.
Therefore, we commit, where necessary and appropriate, to: strengthen property rights and expand
the use of property as collateral, ensuring enforceable, efficient, transparent, comprehensive, and
equitable rules governing property contracts; and improve or promote the related measures
governing the transfer of property, property registries, the use of property as collateral, and the
rights and responsibilities of debtors and creditors.
With regard to these measures, we commit to undertake concrete actions prior to the next Summit
of the Americas to be held in Argentina in 2005, and to report at that time on progress achieved. We
will seek to ensure that property rights benefit all people without discrimination.
Fourth Summit of the Americas, Buenos Aires, Argentina November 4-5, 2005
Growth with Employment mandate from the Plan of Action, Member States agree:
“32. To stimulate the design or strengthening of mechanisms or initiatives for access to credit by,
among other measures, the fostering of the property registry and cadastre, in which legal certainty is
expressed, among other means, through the verification of the title and the use of it, ensuring that
the property rights benefit all people without discrimination.
(source: USAID, “The Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative” (Washington, D.C.: working paper by the
Broad-based Economic Growth Team Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID, Nd).
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APPENDIX IV
Inter-American Development Bank
Multi-lateral Investment Fund (MIF) Cluster Action Plan
Website: http://www.iadb.org/mif/v2/files/propertyactionplan_eng.pdf
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN
I. Background
1.2 The MIF cluster Effective Property Rights will contain from 10-12 projects that aim to improve
the functioning of markets and the environment facing businesses and investors. Projects in the
cluster address specific bottlenecks in the web of laws, regulations and institutions that prevent
moveable and immoveable property from serving as the foundation of private sector development
and wealth. As part of a cluster, these projects share the same technical theme and development
goals, and hence can be managed and monitored as a group. This will promote the effective and
sustainable use of MIF resources, generate scale economies and foster the dissemination of projectspecific information and experiences that feed into important lessons learned and best practices.
These projects will be innovative, combining existing models with newer approaches to promote
catalytic demonstration effects across the Region.
Breathing Life into Dead Capital
1.3 All business transactions and investment deals are based on rules of property. The rules of
property determine in large part the economically useful aspects of assets. Formal rules of property
enable property to be legally represented in writing (e.g. as a title, contract, security, etc.). In
advanced property systems, these legal representations enable property to be used as collateral for a
loan, as equity to be exchanged for an investment, as an address for collecting debts or taxes, and for
many other purposes. Without functioning property rights, capital itself cannot be created, thus
preventing people from pledging, leveraging (e.g. using moveable collateral, buildings or land parcels
to secure loans), and moving their assets. Therefore many businesses, investors and property holders
are excluded from a fundamental benefit of the market system. Housing markets, mortgages, tax
collection, urban and national planning all cease to function efficiently when property rights do not
function. Moreover, most market reforms cannot fully succeed where rules governing property are
unclear or absent.
(source: Inter-American Development Bank, “Multi-lateral Investment Fund (MIF) Cluster Action Plan”
Nd.)
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APPENDIX V
The Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector Research Center
University of Maryland
Website: http://www.iris.umd.edu/StaticReader.aspx/About_IRIS.htm
IRIS is a research and advisory center located in the Department of Economics at the University of
Maryland, College Park.
We work to understand and facilitate economic growth and democratic development in poor and
transition countries, focusing on the role of institutions — the formal and informal rules by which
individuals organize economic, political, and social activity.
Research, Implementation, Strategy
In partnership with scholars, international donors, and reformers, IRIS designs and supports reform
efforts, improves the delivery of foreign assistance, and promotes knowledge sharing. IRIS is widely
recognized as
•

A pre-eminent policy research institute on institutional reform and economic development

•

An implementer of innovative reform projects in the field

•

A source of strategic thinking and insight on development issues

IRIS was among the first to show that market-augmenting institutions — such as property rights
and contract enforcement — are key to development and are more secure when they are embedded
in democratic governance structures. Understanding how these institutions evolve and applying
these insights to specific problems forms the work of IRIS’s home office and field teams.
Knowledge Generation & Dissemination
IRIS seeks to generate new knowledge and insights through all of our activities. We publish books,
articles, working papers, and country reports, and conduct training sessions and briefings at USAID
and other development and economic institutions around the world. Some IRIS staff also teach and
advise in their academic departments, as faculty members of the University of Maryland.

(source: The Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector Research Center. (University of Maryland, Nd.)).
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APPENDIX VI
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
Website: http://www.lincolninst.edu/aboutlincoln/index.asp
Introduction to the Lincoln Institute
The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy is a nonprofit and tax-exempt educational institution founded
in 1974 to improve the quality of public debate and decisions in the areas of land policy and landrelated taxation. The Institute's goals are to integrate theory and practice to better shape land policy
and to provide a nonpartisan forum for discussion of the multidisciplinary forces that influence
public policy. Inspired by the work of Henry George as expressed in the book Progress and Poverty
(1879), the Lincoln Institute introduces his thinking and ideas into the contemporary land and tax
policy debate to advance a more equitable and productive society. The work of the Institute is
organized in three departments and two programs:
•
Department of Planning and Development
•
Department of Valuation and Taxation
•
Department of International Studies
•
Program on Latin America and the Caribbean
•
Program on the People's Republic of China
The Institute seeks to inform decision making through education, research, dissemination of
information, and demonstration projects in the United States and internationally. Our programs
bring together scholars, practitioners, public officials, policy advisers, and involved citizens in a
collegial learning community. The Institute does not take a particular point of view, but rather serves
as a catalyst to facilitate analysis and discussion of land use and taxation issues — to make a
difference today and to help policy makers plan for tomorrow.
While most programs focus on land and tax policy in the United States, the Institute recognizes the
effects of the global economy and urbanization on land uses, land markets, and fiscal
decentralization. We have a special interest in Latin America and the Caribbean, where we
have developed a collaborative network of scholars and public officials who work toward
understanding and improving land policies in different contexts.
The Institute offers two types of courses: executive courses and professional development courses.
Executive courses, offered by invitation, present a unique opportunity for senior professionals and
policy makers to learn with peers and colleagues in the areas of taxation, planning, and development.
Professional development courses are available through open enrollment to practitioners, academics,
and concerned citizens. Some courses are cosponsored with professional and academic associations,
community-based organizations, local government agencies, and other educational institutions. In
addition to the courses, the Institute supports many national and international conferences,
seminars, and lectures. The Institute also has expanded the number and variety of online courses,
publications, and educational resources. To ensure the continued development of innovative and
professional ideas and practices, the Institute supports visiting faculty, graduate students, and
professional fellows engaged in research on many aspects of land use and land-related taxation. It
also publishes and disseminates the work of its fellows and faculty members.
(source: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (Cambridge, MA: Nd))
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APPENDIX VII
World Bank Country Study Policy Matrix
**Policies with short-term impact
*Policies with medium and long-term impact
Key Constraints

Policy Options

1. The debt crisis and fiscal deterioration

Extend tax base, rationalize taxes and reduce
tertiary education subsidy

Revenues are already high, at 29.6 percent of GDP in
2002/03 (tax revenues 26.4 percent of GDP). Tax
revenues will need to increase further in order to
make the fiscal and debt situation more sustainable.
This could be achieved if the informal sector could
be better taxed and tax rates across sectors
rationalized.

**Reduce the disparity in tax rates across sectors.
**Extend the tax base to include more of the
informal sector by a system of presumptive taxes
based on consumption indicators.
*Levy and increase tolls on upcoming and existing
infrastructure facilities.
**Reduce subsidy on tertiary education
*Build social consensus and buy-in for difficult, but
necessary, economic policy choices.

2. Pervasive and high crime and violence

Identify and measure crime better

Jamaica has very high rates of violent crime,
including the third highest homicide rate in the
world.

*Strengthen official data collection on crime, and
conduct frequent victimization surveys. These would
be an input for policy-making, improving policing
methods, public debate and better accountability.

Crime imposes major costs on society and business,
which limit growth (see below).
The empirical foundation for action on crime is
weak.
Crime costs society at least 4 percent of GDP
explicitly, including lost production, health expenses,
and public and private spending. In addition,
exporting firms’ security costs can be as high as 5
percent of sales, small firms’ losses due to extortion,
fraud, robbery and arson can be 9 percent of
revenue, with an average of 3-6 percent for firms in
manufacturing and distribution.
Crime reduces the efficiency of capital use by limiting
multi-shift operations, and of schooling because of
closures. It results in major implicit social costs.
The costs of crime limit growth. Some 10-20 percent
of firms in the business survey suggested that they

Improve enforcement, increase social capital,
and target high crime areas.
*Upgrade investigative capacity of police to improve
clear-up rates for violent crime, which would deter
such crime.
*Form effective partnerships between police business
and local communities, by setting common goals and
sharing information.
*Build social capital such as greater trust and lower
tolerance to crime and violence, especially through
interventions in the home, school and workplace.
*Target high crime urban areas, especially the
Kingston Metropolitan Area to reduce the impact of
crime on the business community.
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may close down in the next three years because of
crime.
4. Inadequate credit access for private sector
Jamaica quickly resolved its massive financial crisis,
and strengthened financial regulation and supervision
but at great cost. Jamaican Government debt is now
about 45 percent of bank deposits, about twice the
share of private credit. With high and relatively riskfree returns on government debt, banks have become
more reluctant to lend to private firms, especially
small firms and start-ups, which constrains a
potentially vibrant source of GDP and export
growth. In fact, with the current returns on
government debt, even some current and potential
entrepreneurs may become rentiers.

Start credit registries and improve collateral
procedures
**Reduce the demand for resources by government,
which means increasing the primary surplus-see
above. This will increase availability of credit for the
private sector, gradually reduce interest rates, and
also improve the incentives for entrepreneurial rather
than rentier behavior.
*Accelerate the startup of credit registries to improve
lending quality and quantity. Registries allow financial
intermediaries to lend to borrowers more likely to
repay and give borrowers an incentive to repay to
maintain a good credit record. Credit registries can
increase access by including small borrowers and
records of loan repayments as well as defaults.
*Improve collateral procedures, perhaps by creating
debt tribunals separate from the court system, as
other countries have done. Lenders and businessmen
have complained about the courts’ handling of
commercial cases.

(Source: World Bank (2004), 4-6)
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